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RISKY BUSINESS: LIABILITY OF PRODUCT
SELLERS WHO OFFER SAFETY DEVICES AS
OPTIONAL EQUIPMENT
Richard C. Ausness*
I. INTRODUCTION
Manufacturers often offer their products in different grades of
quality or provide some features as optional equipment. Motor vehicles
provide a good example of this marketing practice. Typically, a
consumer can choose from a wide variety of optional equipment and the
difference in price between the "stripped down" and the "fully loaded"
version of a particular model may amount to thousands of dollars.' This
practice does not cause much concern when optional equipment, such as
satellite radio systems or heated seats, merely provides more comfort or
convenience. But what about devices, such as antilock brakes or side
airbags, that actually increase product safety? Should manufacturers be
allowed to produce and sell "safer" and "more dangerous" versions of
the same product?
This issue can be examined from a number of perspectives. The
first is doctrinal. The Products Liability Restatement2 and the courts of
most states, require one who brings a design defect claim against a
product seller to provide evidence of a reasonable alternative design
("RAD") that would be feasible, cost-effective, and would have
prevented his or her injuries.3 Can a plaintiff, who purchases a product
that is not equipped with a particular safety device satisfy the RAD
requirement by offering evidence that the product was available with the
device as optional equipment? If so, can the plaintiff then argue that the
* Gallon & Baker Professor of Law, University of Kentucky; B.A. 1966, J.D. 1968,
University of Florida; LL.M. 1973, Yale University.
1. J. Michael Wright, Are You Ready to Buy a Car? New or Used-The Ten Thousand
Dollar Question, EZINE ARTICLES (Nov. 21, 2010), http://ezinearticles.com/?Are-You-Ready-to-
Buy-a-Car?-New-or-Used---The-Ten-Thousand-Dollar-Question&id=5421766.
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LiAB. (1998).
3. See id. §2(b),§2cmts. b&d.
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stripped down version of the product is defective or "not reasonably
safe" because its design did not include the safety device as standard
equipment?
The second issue raised by the sale of optional safety equipment is
normative. Should consumers be free to accept increased risk in return
for a lower price or greater convenience when they purchase a product or
should the appropriate level of product safety be determined on a
collective basis by juries in tort cases? In other words, should
paternalism trump personal autonomy? The tension between these two
values runs through products liability law, but it is especially strong in
cases where consumers reject safer alternatives.
This Article examines the question of whether (or when) product
sellers should be allowed to offer optional safety equipment without fear
of being held strictly liable for selling a defectively designed product.
Part II of this Article examines several approaches to risk-bearing. At
one end of the spectrum, the principle of personal autonomy dictates that
consumers should decide how much risk they wish to accept. On the
other hand, products liability law assumes that if consumers are allowed
to subject themselves to greater risk, producers will be quick to take
advantage of their inability to make rational decisions about what risks
to bear. Finally, economic analysis suggests that manufacturers should
be responsible for reducing product-related risks when they are the
"cheapest cost avoiders," but should be allowed to shift risks when
consumers have superior knowledge or ability to avoid or manage those
risks.
Part III examines a number of cases where the manufacturer
designs a product in accordance with plans and specifications provided
by the purchaser. In such cases, the courts usually apply the contract
specification doctrine, which protects manufacturers from liability to
product users unless the design flaw is obvious. Part III also evaluates
cases involving the sale of "naked" products, where the manufacturer of
industrial machinery delivers the product without safety devices, leaving
it up to the purchaser to decide what safety equipment to install.
Although some courts hold the manufacturer liable if the product is
defective as sold, the modem trend is to allow the manufacturer to
delegate the responsibility for installing safety equipment to the
purchaser, particularly if the product is a multi-purpose one.
Part IV looks at cases involving the provision of safety equipment
on an optional basis by the manufacturer of products intended for
industrial or commercial use. Many of these cases authorize
manufacturers to shift the responsibility for product safety from
themselves to purchasers by allowing the purchaser to choose what
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safety equipment they wish to have installed. This is somewhat
surprising because decisions about optional safety equipment, which are
typically made by employers, may very well be suboptimal because the
employers who make these decisions are not the ones who are exposed
to the resulting product-related risks.
Part V examines decisions involving optional safety equipment on
products manufactured for ordinary household use. It reveals that courts
have employed four approaches in such cases. The first approach is to
determine whether the product is defective in the condition in which it is
actually sold, that is, without optional safety equipment. A second
approach is to allow the manufacturer to offer optional safety equipment
without liability as long as the consumer has superior knowledge about
the risks associated with the intended use of the product. A third
approach imposes liability on sellers of single-purpose products if they
fail to offer cost-effective safety features as standard equipment, but
allow sellers of multi-purpose products to offer safety equipment on an
optional basis. Finally, an approach developed by the New York courts
allows a seller to offer an optional safety feature without risking tort
liability if: (1) the buyer is thoroughly knowledgeable regarding the
product and its use and is actually aware that the safety feature is
available; (2) there are some uses for which optional equipment is not
necessary; and (3) the buyer is in a position to evaluate risks and benefits
of not purchasing a particular safety device.4
Part VI evaluates some of the approaches that courts have used to
determine whether a product seller can offer safety devices as optional
equipment without incurring tort liability. This analysis considers these
approaches in terms of personal autonomy, consumer protection, and
economic efficiency. Finally, Part VII proposes a new approach to the
issue of optional safety equipment in connection with both products
designed for use in industrial or commercial settings and those that are
intended to be sold to ordinary consumers.
II. PERSONAL AUTONOMY, PATERNALISM, AND ACCIDENT COST
AVOIDANCE
From the beginning, two competing sets of values have competed
for dominance in the law of products liability. The first of these is
personal autonomy. Personal autonomy is strongly reflected in the law
of sales and the Uniform Commercial Code.5 On the other hand,
4. See Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 683 (N.Y. 1999). See also
infra Part V.D.
5. See David Frisch, Rational Retroactivity in a Commercial Context, 58 ALA. L. REv. 765,
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products liability law, to the extent that it is based on tort law principles,
is more paternalistic. For example, the liability standard, whether
defined as "defective," "unreasonably dangerous," or "not reasonably
safe," subjects buyers and sellers alike to a socially determined
minimum standard of safety. Furthermore, this minimum safety standard
cannot be contracted away by disclaimers or waivers.6 Thus, products
liability law requires consumers to accept a certain level of safety (and to
pay for it) whenever they purchase new products. This portion of the
Article will evaluate the argument for consumer choice, as well as the
argument for paternalism as it relates to risk-bearing. It will also
consider whether the economic concept of shifting responsibility for
product safety to the "cheapest cost avoider" supports expanding
consumer choice over product safety matters.
A. The Argument for Allowing Consumers to Bear More Risk
The argument in favor of allowing consumers to bear product-
related risks is based principally on the concept of personal autonomy.
The notion of personal autonomy assumes that individuals should have
the power to make meaningful choices in their lives without having to
justify them to others.7 This is based on the unique capacity of human
beings to reason and to act according to normative principles.8 Personal
autonomy has deep roots in philosophy, political theory, and popular
culture. 9 Respect for the principle of personal autonomy is also reflected
in the American legal system.'0 For example, a number of legal scholars
have concluded that personal autonomy informs the First Amendment's
protection of free expression" as well as the due process and equal
776 (2007).
6. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 18 (1998).
7. See Stephen Gardbaum, Liberalism, Autonomy, and Moral Conflict, 48 STAN. L. REV.
385, 395 (1996).
8. See Scott A. Fisk, Comment, The Last Best Place to Die: Physician-Assisted Suicide and
Montana's Constitutional Right to Personal Autonomy Privacy, 59 MONT. L. REV. 301, 326 (1998)
(quoting DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, SEX, DRUGS, DEATH, AND THE LAW 8 (1982)).
9. See Peter L. Berger, Furtive Smokers-and What They Tell Us About America,
COMMENTARY, June 1994, at 21, 26 (remarking that "a strong tradition of individual autonomy has
existed in America, expressed in folklore and literature, in everyday patterns of interaction ... and
of course in political institutions and law").
10. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891) ("No right is held more sacred,
or is more carefully guarded, by the common law, than the right of every individual to the
possession and control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others, unless by
clear and unquestionable authority of law."); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104 (Kan. 1960)
(observing that "Anglo-American law starts with the premise of thorough-going self-
determination").
11. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Two Senses ofAutonomy, 46 STAN. L. REV. 875, 875, 902-03
(1994); Robert C. Post, Racist Speech, Democracy, and the First Amendment, 32 WM. & MARY L.
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protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and the constitutional
right of privacy.' 2 The Supreme Court has also accorded constitutional
protection to a number of other autonomy interests, such as the right to
travel,13 the right of free association, 14 and such privacy interests as the
right to procreate 5 or not to procreate, 6 and the right to marry.' 7 Finally,
at the state level, courts have protected other aspects of personal
autonomy, such as the right to refuse medical treatment.18 The principle
of personal autonomy supports the notion that individuals should be
allowed to take economic risks. Indeed, the courts have often recognized
the benefits of allowing individuals to allocate economic risk among
themselves by contract.' 9
Personal autonomy also supports the notion that individuals should
be allowed to make choices that expose them to the risk of personal
injury. The drafters of the Products Liability Restatement appear to
agree with this position. For example, a comment to Section 2 of the
Products Liability Restatement contains a hypothetical which states that
the manufacturer of bullet-proof vests offers several models.2 ° Some
models provide front and back protection only, while others provide
wrap-around protection. The plaintiff s employer has chosen to purchase
a model that provides only front and back protection because it is
cheaper, more comfortable, and allows greater flexibility of movement.
REv. 267, 279-85 (1991); see generally Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L.
REv. 591 (1982).
12. See Rogers M. Smith, The Constitution and Autonomy, 60 TEX. L. REV. 175, 189, 191-92
(1982).
13. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630-31 (1969) (citations omitted).
14. See, e.g., Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644, 647-48 (2000).
15. See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 536, 541 (1942).
16. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851-52 (1992) (deciding on the
right to an abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (deciding on the right to an abortion);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 443 (1972) (deciding on the right to use contraceptives);
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (deciding on the right to use contraceptives).
17. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383, 387 (1978) (invalidating a state law
restricting the fight to marry); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (invalidating a state law
prohibiting interracial marriages).
18. See, e.g., Bartling v. Superior Court, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 221, 224 (Ct. App. 1984)
(allowing a non-terminally ill competent patient to refuse all life-sustaining procedures); Satz v.
Perlmutter, 362 So. 2d 160, 161-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978), affd, 379 So. 2d 359, 360 (Fla. 1980)
(allowing a terminally ill competent patient to order withdrawal of a respirator); Brophy v. New
England Sinai Hosp., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 626, 628, 638-40 (Mass. 1986) (allowing discontinuation of
the nutrition and hydration of a non-terminally ill incompetent patient); In re Farrell, 529 A.2d 404,
416 (N.J. 1987) (allowing a terminally ill competent person to compel discontinuation of life-
sustaining care).
19. See E. River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 871-73
(1986); Seely v. White Motor Co., 403 P.2d 145, 151 (Cal. 1965).
20. RESTATEMENT (THIRD)OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f, illus. 10 (1998).
20111
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When the plaintiff, a highway patrol officer, is shot and killed during a
routine traffic stop, his personal representative sues the manufacturer,
alleging that the vest was defective because it did not incorporate a safer
alternative design. The drafters of the Products Liability Restatement
conclude that the vest's design is not defective just because it has
disadvantages as well as advantages.21 While this could merely be an
illustration of the risk-utility test for design defects,2 the more likely
interpretation is that consumers ought to be able to purchase a riskier
product even though a safer model might be available. In other words,
personal autonomy vindicates the right of consumers, at least in some
cases, to make decisions about product-related risks that might not
necessarily optimize accident costs. This conclusion is reinforced by the
drafters comment that "[t]o subject sellers to liability based on that
design would unduly restrict the range of consumer choice among
products.' 23
B. The Case Against Allowing Consumers to Choose Riskier
Alternatives
Products liability law generally prohibits sellers from shifting
preventable risks to consumers. For example, both the Restatement
(Second) of Torts and the Products Liability Restatement refuse to give
effect to contractual disclaimers or waivers of liability. 24 In addition, the
Products Liability Restatement, following the overwhelming weight of
authority,25 has rejected the patent danger rule in design defect cases and
made it clear that manufacturers have a duty to eliminate obvious risks
when they could do so by cost-effective design changes.26 This suggests
that manufacturers generally must reduce or eliminate risks whenever it
is cost-effective to do so, even though consumers are willing to accept
additional risk in exchange for a lower product price.
The traditional rationale for protecting consumers is that they are at
such a disadvantage when it comes to making decisions about risk-
21. Id.
22. See discussion infra Part VIA.
23. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f, illus. 10.
24. See id. § 18 (stating that disclaimers and other contractual limitations on liability "do not
bar or reduce otherwise valid products liability claims against sellers or other distributors of new
products for harm to persons"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. m (1965)
(declaring that a personal injury claim by a consumer against a product seller "is not affected by any
disclaimer or other agreement").
25. See, e.g., Calles v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 864 N.E.2d 249, 260 (Ill. 2007); Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 577 (N.Y. 1976); see also DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY
LAW 647-48, 651-52 (2d ed. 2008).
26. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. d.
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bearing that it is unconscionable to let them do SO. 27 In particular,
information asymmetry, inequality of bargaining power, and cognitive
limitations are said to make it virtually impossible for consumers and
product sellers to allocate the risk of personal injury by private
agreement.
1. Information Asymmetry
One reason for protecting consumers is that they do not have
adequate information about product-related risks and, therefore,
systematically underestimate them.28 According to this narrative,
consumers often lack accurate information because it is costly in terms
29of money and effort to acquire. Manufacturers, in contrast, usually
know a great deal about the quality and safety of their products3a
Consequently, consumers typically must rely on manufacturers and
others in the distributive chain to provide reliable information about the
products they sell.3 1 However, manufacturers are not always willing to
share this sort of information with consumers and in some cases may
have actually concealed information about the risks associated with the
use or consumption of their products.3 2 Writing in 1965, Professor
Thomas Cowan used the following colorful language to describe the
unequal relationship between product sellers and consumers:
To put the matter bluntly, a large proportion of mass products are
consciously made as inferior as the traffic will bear and are advertised
by conscious misrepresentation as far superior to their known quality.
The combination of low quality production and high quality lying
makes it impossible for those using the products of mass manufacture
to distinguish good merchandise from bad without the services of a
general testing laboratory.
33
Unfortunately, nothing much seems to have changed as more recent
scholarship suggests that some manufacturers continue to conceal or
27. See Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 377 P.2d 897, 901 (Cal. 1963); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 78 (N.J. 1960).
28. Steven P. Croley & Jon D. Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The Revived Case for
Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REv. 683, 707 (1993).
29. See id. at 770.
30. See David G. Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability, 33 VAND. L.
REv. 681, 711 (1980) [hereinafter Rethinking the Policies of Strict Products Liability].
31. See Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring); Henningsen, 161 A.2d at 83.
32. See Lindley J. Brenza, Comment, Asbestos in Schools and the Economic Loss Doctrine,
54 U. CHI. L. REv. 277, 291 (1987).
33. See Thomas A. Cowan, Some Policy Bases of Products Liability, 17 STAN. L. REV. 1077,
1087 (1965).
2011] RISKY BUS1NESS
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misrepresent product risks.34 At the same time, information is now
available from government agencies like the Consumer Product Safety
Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Environmental
Protection Agency, and the Food and Drug Administration, as well as
publications like Consumer Reports.35 In addition, blogs and other
Internet sources also provide information about the quality and safety of
many products. 6 Thus, the increased availability of product information
undermines the information asymmetry rationale somewhat.
2. Inequality of Bargaining Power
Even when consumers obtain reliable information about product
safety, they may not have sufficient bargaining power to secure
contractual protection against such risks.37 In today's mass marketing
environment, it is not practical for consumers and product sellers to
engage in face-to-face bargaining; instead, non-negotiable standard form
contracts are the norm. 8 Enterprises with strong bargaining power are
particularly likely to utilize adhesion contracts to limit their exposure to
liability.39 The classic example of this practice can be found in
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc.,4° where an adhesion contract
drafted by an automobile manufacturer's trade association expressly
disclaimed liability for personal injuries.41 Anyone who wished to
purchase a motor vehicle from an American car manufacturer had to
forego the protection normally accorded by the implied warranty of
merchantability.
42
34. See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence
of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1496-1502 (1999) (discussing the intentional
misrepresentation of the tobacco industry).
35. See CONSUMER REPS., http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/index.htm (last visited Nov.
11, 2011); For Consumers, U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/ForConsumers/
default.htm (last updated Sept. 26, 2011); U.S. CONSUMER PRODUCT SAFETY COMMISSION,
http://www.cpsc.gov (last updated Sept. 27, 2011); U.S. ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
http://www.epa.gov (last visited Nov. 11, 2011); Welcome to the Bureau of Consumer Protection,
FED. TRADE COMM'N, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/index.shtml (last modified Feb. 1,2011).
36. E.g., About the Child Safety Blog (CSB), CHILDSAFETYBLOG, http://www.childsafety
blog.org/about.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2011).
37. See Michael B. Metzger, Disclaimers, Limitations of Remedy, and Third Parties, 48 U.
CIN. L. REV. 663, 687 (1979).
38. See Anthony T. Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 770-
71 (1983) (discussing how consumer contracts are often considered contracts of adhesion because
there is an imbalance in the bargaining power of the parties).
39. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69, 78 (N.J. 1960); W. David
Slawson, Mass Contracts: Lawful Fraud in California, 48 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (1974).
40. 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960).
41. Id. at 78-80.
42. Id.
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Nowadays, product sellers, especially those with a large market
share, still have considerable economic power and continue to limit face-
to-face bargaining by relying on non-negotiable standard form sales
contracts.43 Nevertheless, foreign and domestic competition has eroded
the monopoly power that many manufacturers took advantage of during
the first half of the last century.44 Consequently, consumers who do not
like the quality, price, or warranty terms that a particular seller offers are
free to look for a better deal elsewhere. 45 This suggests that inequality of
bargaining power may be less of a problem today than it was forty or
fifty years ago.
3. Cognitive Limitations
Classical economic theory assumes that individuals act in a rational
manner to maximize their utility.46 This is known as the "rational
choice" or "expected utility theory" model of decision making.47
Furthermore, when a decision involves risk or uncertainty, rational
actors take into account the probability of various alternatives
occurring. 48 However, social science research suggests that such rational
decision making is often limited by the inability of people to process
information effectively. 49 This condition is sometimes referred to as
"bounded rationality." 50 These cognitive limitations may produce risk-
allocation decisions that are not consistent with the laws of probability
or expected utility.51
43. See Slawson, supra note 39, at 2,47-48.
44. See generally CHARLES R. GEISST, MONOPOLIES IN AMERICA: EMPIRE BUILDERS AND
THEIR ENEMIES FROM JAY GOULD TO BILL GATES (2000).
45. Recent social science research suggests that consumers as a group can exert considerable
influence over sellers in a competitive environment, particularly if a significant number of them are
willing to "shop around" for the best deal. See Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect
Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69
VA. L. REV. 1387, 1450-51 (1983). Since most sellers rely on standard form contracts, those who
compete for the business of shoppers will have to offer the same terms to nonshoppers as well. See
id. This process puts pressure on sellers to improve product quality and warranty protection for
everyone. See id
46. See Richard L. Hasen, Comment, Efficiency Under Informational Asymmetry: The Effect
of Framing on Legal Rules, 38 UCLA L. REv. 391, 394 (1990).
47. Id. at 394 n.10; Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Rational Choice and the Framing of
Decisions, 59 J. Bus. S251, S252 (Supp. 1986).
48. See Roger G. Noll & James E. Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for Risk
Regulation, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 747, 750 (1990).
49. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 34, at 1425.
50. See Howard Latin, "Good" Warnings, Bad Products, and Cognitive Limitations, 41
UCLA L. REV. 1193, 1199 (1994).
51. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN.
L. REV. 211, 213 (1995).
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One type of bounded rationality involves people who overestimate
their ability to cope with risk or underestimate the fact that their
knowledge or judgment may be deficient.52 For example, a number of
people have been injured while trying to make shallow dives into above
ground swimming pools, 53 other people have overestimated their
capacity to tolerate alcohol,5 4 and numerous workers unsuccessfully
matched wits with heavy machinery. 5 In some cases, individuals may
even suffer from a "third-person effect" in which they assume that the
inherent risks associated with a particular activity will somehow not
apply to them.56 The belief of many cigarette smokers that they will not
suffer any adverse health effects from smoking is an example of this
phenomenon.57
People also tend to reject or discount information about risk that
contradicts their preexisting beliefs or biases.5 8 This is known as
"cognitive dissonance., 59 For example, people who are attracted to
styling or power in an automobile may disregard information about the
automobile's risks or quality problems. 60 Another cognitive problem
involves "faulty telescopic faculties," where people give less weight than
they should to future costs and benefits, while overestimating present
costs and benefits.61
Finally, reliance on certain decision making rules, known as
"cognitive heuristics," may lead people to miscalculate risks.62
Heuristics enable people to simplify the decision making process by
relying on cognitive short-cuts and rules of thumb.63 For example, when
making a judgment about the probability of an event occurring, people
will often employ an availability heuristic by comparing it with
52. See Noll & Krier, supra note 48, at 754-55.
53. See, e.g., Corbin v. Coleco Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 411,412-13 (7th Cir. 1984); Glittenberg
v. Doughboy Recreational Indus., 491 N.W.2d 208, 210 (Mich. 1992); Belling v. Haugh's Pools,
Ltd., 511 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (App. Div. 1987).
54. See, e.g., LeBouef v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 623 F.2d 985, 988 (5th Cir. 1980);
Pemberton v. Am. Distilled Spirits Co., 664 S.W.2d 690, 691 (Tenn. 1984); Brune v. Brown
Forman Corp., 758 S.W.2d 827, 827-28 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
55. See, e.g., Bates v. John Deere Co., 195 Cal. Rptr. 637, 639 (Ct. App. 1983); Micallef v.
Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 573 (N.Y. 1976).
56. See Jon D. Hanson & Kyle D. Logue, The Costs of Cigarettes: The Economic Case for Ex
Post Incentive-Based Regulation, 107 YALE L.J. 1163, 1186 (1998).
57. Idat186-87.
58. See Robert C. Ellickson, Bringing Culture and Human Frailly to Rational Actors: A
Critique of Classical Law and Economics, 65 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 23, 42 (1989).
59. Latin, supra note 50, at 1234.
60. Id.
61. Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 222.
62. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 34, at 1433; see also Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 218.
63. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 34, at 1433.
[Vol. 39:807
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something that they regard as analogous or comparable instead of
evaluating objective data.64 While this may cause people to overestimate
the risks of rare but vivid events, such as airplane crashes or toxic waste
spills, it may also lead them to underestimate the risks of more
commonplace events, like injuries from ladders or power tools.
65
People who utilize a representativeness heuristic, sometimes
referred to as the "law of small numbers," focus on a small portion of
data, which they believe is representative of the whole, instead of basing
their decision on all of the available data.66 Supermarkets often take
advantage of the representative heuristic by pricing staples, such as milk
or eggs, at low levels.67 Experience shows that consumers will falsely
assume that because these products are bargains, other products in the
store will also be competitively priced.6s
The way a choice is framed also affects the decision. 69 For example,
test subjects preferred the certain loss of $50 over a 25% chance of a
$200 loss when it was described as insurance, but favored the
probabilistic loss when it was characterized as a game of chance even
though the two risks were mathematically the same.70  Food
manufacturers take advantage of the framing heuristic when they label
products 75% "fat free" instead of describing them as containing 25%
fat.7
1
Finally, when individuals form an initial impression or "anchor,"
they tend to adjust it in response to new information instead of re-
examining their decision from scratch.72 Product sellers, such as
automobile dealers, take advantage of this anchoring heuristic by
displaying a sticker price prominently on each of their vehicles.73 Even
though dealers know that they will not receive the full sticker price when
they sell their cars, they still gain an advantage because the actual selling
price will be biased toward the initial or "anchor" price set by the
dealer. 74 When consumers employ the anchoring heuristic in evaluating
product-related risks in the face of changing information, the ultimate
64. See Latin, supra note 50, at 1233.
65. Id. at 1233-34.
66. Eisenberg, supra note 51, at 222; Hanson & Kysar, supra note 34, at 1449.
67. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 34, at 1449.
68. Id.
69. Noll & Krier, supra note 48, at 753-54.
70. Baruch Fischhoff, Cognitive Liabilities and Product Liability, 1 J. PRODUCTS LIAB. 207,
213 (1977).
71. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 34, at 1451-52.
72. See Thomas S. Ulen, Cognitive Imperfections and the Economic Analysis of Law, 12
HAMLINE L. REv. 385,400 (1989).
73. See Hanson & Kysar, supra note 34, at 1440.
74. Id.
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risk estimate will tend to be biased toward the original risk estimate even
when new information indicates that the original estimate
underestimated the risk.75
These cognitive limitations are not necessarily mutually exclusive.
Rather, they "are interrelated and often cumulative. 76 Furthermore,
manufacturers have every incentive to exploit these cognitive limitations
in order to minimize consumers' awareness of the risks associated with
their products.7 7 All of this undermines the autonomy rationale and
suggests that consumers should not be allowed to allocate risks by
private agreements with sellers.78
C. The Accident Cost Avoidance Perspective
Another view of this issue is provided by law and economics
scholarship which contends that tort law can reduce accident costs to an
optimal level if it ensures that accident costs are borne by the "cheapest
cost avoider," that is, the party who is in the best position to discover
accident risks and employ cost-effective measures to reduce or eliminate
them.79 Most commentators assume that the "cheapest cost avoider" is
the producer rather than the consumer.80 Their control over the design
and production process enables producers to prevent or reduce many
product-related risks. 8' However, producers have little incentive to
improve product safety as long as the costs of product-related injuries
are largely borne by consumers. Shifting these accident costs to
producers by means of strict liability internalizes these costs and thereby
forces producers to choose between paying damages for the injuries that
their products cause, or spending money to reduce or prevent the injuries
from occurring in the first place.1
2
75. Latin, supra note 50, at 1237-38.
76. Id. at 1240.
77. Hanson & Kysar, supra note 34, at 1427.
78. See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 45, at 1450 (discussing how consumers as a group
often have considerable power to affect the behavior of product sellers).
79. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
135 (5th prtg. 1977); Guido Calabresi, Does the Fault System Optimally Control Primary Accident
Costs?, 33 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 429, 436, 438 n.14 (1968); Guido Calabresi, Some Thoughts on
Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L.J. 499, 505 (1961); Guido Calabresi, The
Decision for Accidents: An Approach to Nonfault Allocation of Costs, 78 HARV. L. REv. 713, 726-
29 (1965) [hereinafter The Decision for Accidents].
80. See, e.g., The Decision for Accidents, supra note 79, at 727-29; Rethinking the Policies of
Strict Products Liability, supra note 30, at 712.
81. See Mary J. Davis, Individual and Institutional Responsibility: A Vision for Comparative
Fault in Products Liability, 39 VILL. L. REV. 281, 347 (1994); Rethinking the Policies of Strict
Products Liability, supra note 30, at 711.
82. See Craig Brown, Deterrence and Accident Compensation Schemes, 17 U.W. ONTARIO L.
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This does not mean that imposing strict liability compels producers
to make their products as safe as current technology permits; rather, it
creates an economic incentive to achieve an optimal level of
expenditures on product safety.83 In other words, producers are
encouraged to spend money on product safety as long as the marginal
cost of additional product-related injuries is less than the marginal
reduction of expected tort liability. 84 Conversely, a producer will choose
to pay damage claims when the marginal cost of further product safety
expenditures equals or exceeds the marginal benefits of additional
accident cost reduction.s However, by forcing producers to internalize
the costs of injuries from defective products, the imposition of strict
liability encourages producers to devote an optimal, but not excessive,
amount of resources to product safety.
The accident cost optimization analysis, with its emphasis on
encouraging manufacturers to implement accident cost avoidance
measures, would seem to support a rule which imposes liability on
manufacturers when they attempt to shift product-related risks to
consumers by offering safety features as optional, instead of standard,
equipment. If a manufacturer is the "cheapest cost avoider," arguably it
is in the best position to decide how much product safety is optimal.
Thus, shifting this decision to consumers is likely to produce a
suboptimal level of accident costs because consumers would be more
likely to make poor choices.
However, sometimes consumers are better able than producers to
manage or avoid certain types of product-related risks. In fact, some
consumers may not be exposed to a particular risk at all. For example,
consumers who do not have small children would have little use for
products with child-proof caps. Other consumers may be better able to
deal with product-related risks because they are more careful, more
experienced, or more intelligent than the average consumer. Thus, a
professional carpenter may not need some of the safety equipment
associated with electric saws or other woodworking equipment that
novices would require. Not only would such consumers not need these
safety features, they might not want them because they are expensive or
because they impair efficient operation of the product.
REV. 111, 128 (1979).
83. See W. Kip Viscusi et al., Deterring Inefficient Pharmaceutical Litigation: An Economic
Rationale for the FDA Regulatory Compliance Defense, 24 SETON HALL L. REV. 1437, 1448-49
(1994).
84. See James A. Henderson, Jr., Product Liability and the Passage of Time: The
Imprisonment of Corporate Rationality, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 765, 768 (1983).
85. See David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A "Public Law"
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 865 (1984).
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This suggests that the law and economics perspective does not
necessarily support any particular across-the-board rule on whether
consumers should be able to accept or reject optional safety equipment.
Instead, an accident cost optimization analysis would seem to favor a
rule that would allow consumers to decline safety equipment in some
circumstances, but not in others. A review of the case law indicates that
courts seem to favor rules that promote allocative efficiency by striking
a balance between consumer sovereignty and consumer protection.
86
1II. THE CONTRACT SPECIFICATION DOCTRINE AND "NAKED"
PRODUCT SALES
There are numerous cases that deal with the issue of liability when
purchasers make decisions about whether to install safety equipment.
However, many of them are not concerned with a consumer's right to
choose whether to purchase optional safety equipment provided by the
manufacturer. It is helpful to examine these cases briefly because they
involve many of the same issues that dominate the optional safety
equipment cases. The cases below fall into two categories: (1) those
where the seller designs the product according to the buyer's
specifications;8 7 and (2) those where the seller relies on the buyer to
8install safety equipment after the product leaves the seller's possession.
A. The Contract Specification Doctrine
The contract specification doctrine provides that a manufacturer
will not be held liable for a design defect when it manufactures a product
according to the purchaser's plans and specifications unless the design is
clearly defective.89 Courts first began to recognize this rule in negligence
actions against building contractors who constructed roads or structures
in accordance with specifications provided by their employers. 90 Many
courts also extended the contract specification defense to manufactured
86. See infra Parts IV, V (discussing cases that set forth rules regarding optional safety
equipment).
87. See infra Part III.A.
88. See infra Part IlI.B.
89. See David G. Owen, Special Defenses in Modern Products Liability Law, 70 MO. L. REV.
1,3(2005).
90. See, e.g., Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832, 834, 836 (2d Cir. 1951);
Littlehale v. E.l. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 793, 795, 797-98 (S.D.N.Y. 1966),
aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967); Davis v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 719 P.2d 324, 325-27 (Colo.
App. 1985); Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 145 N.E. 321, 321-22 (N.Y. 1924); Hardie v.
Charles P. Boland Co., 98 N.E. 661, 662-63 (N.Y. 1912); Curtain v. Somerset, 21 A. 244, 244-45
(Pa. 1891), abrogated by Woodward v. Dietrich, 548 A.2d 301 (Pa. 1988).
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products at a time when liability to injured consumers was determined
by negligence principles rather than strict liability. 9' This version of the
contract specification doctrine was endorsed by the drafters of the
92Restatement (Second) of Torts.
Eventually, a number of courts also allowed product manufacturers
to assert a contract specification defense in strict liability cases.93 For
example, in Moon v. Winger Boss Co. 94 the plaintiff suffered severe
injuries when his arm became entangled in a sprocket and chain located
at the takeup end of a moving conveyor-type breaking table
mechanism. 95 The specifications for the breaking tables, provided by the
plaintiffs employer, did not require the defendant manufacturer to
install chain guards on the conveyor takeups, leaving this part of the
machine unprotected. 96 The plaintiff relied on both negligence and strict
liability theories to argue that the machine was defectively designed.
97
However, relying on the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 98 the appeals
court concluded that the manufacturer would not be liable for injuries to
the user of a product when it manufactured the product in accordance
with plans and specifications provided by the buyer, unless the plans
were "obviously, patently, or glaringly dangerous." 99
More recently, a Missouri appellate court strongly endorsed the
contract specification doctrine in Bloemer v. Art Welding Co.' °° In that
case, two employees were injured while cleaning a large machine known
as a "cyclone."''1 The cyclone was a three-story tall cylindrical tank
91. See Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373, 374-75 (4th Cir. 1973); Moran v. Pittsburgh-
Des Moines Steel Co., 166 F.2d 908, 914-17 (3d Cir. 1948); Md. Cas. Co. v. Indep. Metal Prods.
Co., 99 F. Supp. 862, 867-68 (D. Neb. 1951), aff'd, 203 F.2d 838 (8th Cir. 1953); Wright v. Holland
Furnace Co., 243 N.W. 387, 387-88 (Minn. 1932); Szatkowski v. Turner & Harrison, Inc., 584
N.Y.S.2d 170, 171 (App. Div. 1992).
92. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 cmt. a (1965).
93. See, e.g., Garrison v. Rohm & Haas Co., 492 F.2d 346, 347, 353 (6th Cir. 1974); Housand
v. Bra-Con Indus., Inc., 751 F. Supp. 541, 543 (D. Md. 1990); Lesnefsky v. Fischer & Porter Co.,
527 F. Supp. 951, 953, 955 (E.D. Pa. 1981); Orion Ins. Co. v. United Tech. Corp., 502 F. Supp. 173,
174, 178 (E.D. Pa. 1980); McCabe Powers Body Co. v. Sharp, 594 S.W.2d 592, 593, 595 (Ky.
1980); Bloemer v. Art Welding Co., 884 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994); Moon v. Winger Boss
Co., 287 N.W.2d 430, 432-33 (Neb. 1980); but see Hendricks v. Comerio Ercole, 763 F. Supp. 505,
512-13 (D. Kan. 1991); Collins v. Newman Mach. Co., 380 S.E.2d 314, 316-17 (Ga. Ct. App.
1989).
94. 287 N.W.2d 430 (Neb. 1980).
95. Id. at 431.
96. Id. at 431-32.
97. Id. at 432.
98. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 404 cmt. a (1965).
99. Moon, 287 N.W.2d at 434.
100. 884 S.W.2d 55, 56 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
101. Id. at 57.
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which was used to remove detergent particles from the air. °2 The
machine was designed by the plaintiffs' employer, Lever Brothers, and
fabricated by the defendants in accordance with Lever Brothers'
specifications. 0 3 The plaintiffs were burned by hot water trapped inside
the cyclone as they attempted to open the machine's access door. 10 4 The
plaintiffs brought suit against the defendants, alleging various design
defects.105 On appeal from a lower court ruling in favor of the
defendants, the Missouri intermediate appellate court acknowledged that
the Missouri Supreme Court had recognized the contract specification
doctrine in Gast v. Shell Oil Co., °6a case where a building contractor
performed work in accordance with the landowner's specifications.
0 7
The Bloemer court concluded that the analysis in Gast was essentially
the same as that of the Restatement (Second) of Torts Section 404 which
extended the contract specification doctrine to product manufacturers.' 
08
Therefore, the court held that the contract specification doctrine should
protect the manufacturers of the cyclone from liability.'
0 9
To summarize, the contract specification doctrine protects
manufacturers who allow purchasers to decide how safe they want their
products to be. As a defense to a negligence claim, compliance with
contract specifications can be justified on two grounds. First, if the
manufacturer is not an expert and it is reasonable for it to rely on the
purchaser's superior knowledge, then a manufacturer who fabricates a
product in accordance with the purchaser's specification has exercised
due care and, therefore, is not negligent."0 Second, if the manufacturer
has not participated in the design of the product, but merely played a
passive role, then it is not the negligent party if the plaintiffs claim is
negligent design.'
B. Sales of "Naked" Products
Another group of cases is concerned with manufacturers who sell
dangerous machinery in a "naked" condition, that is, without any safety
equipment at all, and leave it to the purchasers to decide which devices
102. Id.
103. Id. at 56-57.
104. Id. at 57.
105. Id.
106. 819 S.W.2d 367 (Mo. 1991).
107. Id. at 369, 371; Bloemer, 884 S.W.2d at 58-59.
108. Bloemer, 884 S.W.2d at 58-59.
109. Id. at 59.
110. See, e.g., id.; Moon v. Winger Boss Co., 287 N.W.2d 430, 431,434 (Neb. 1980).
111. See, e.g., Bloemer, 884 S.W.2d at 57.
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to install on the products after they leave the manufacturers' control.' 12
Many of these cases involve punch presses and other types of industrial
machinery. 1 3 Some courts have concluded that a product is defective if
it is unreasonably dangerous when sold without safety devices and the
manufacturer cannot shift its responsibility to produce a reasonably safe
product to the purchaser." 4 However, a large number of courts have
taken the opposite view, particularly for multifunctional machinery, and
allowed the manufacturer to delegate the responsibility for installing
safety devices to the purchaser." 1
5
Bexiga v. Havir Manufacturing Corp.1 16 is illustrative of the "no
delegation" approach. 17 In that case, the plaintiff, an eighteen-year-old
punch press operator, was injured when his right hand was crushed by
the ram of the machine." 8 The machine, a ten-ton punch press, consisted
of a hydraulic ram which would descend about five inches, a die area
and, stamp or punch metal discs that were placed in the die." 9 The
manufacturer shipped the punch press to the plaintiff's employer without
installing any safety devices on the machine except for a guard over the
flywheel. 120 The plaintiff was injured when he activated the ram by
stepping on the machine's foot pedal before making sure that his hands
were clear of the die area. 12' The plaintiff brought suit against the
manufacturer, alleging that it had a duty to equip the press with some
form of safety device that would protect the operator from this type of
injury.
122
The trial court dismissed the case at the close of the plaintiffs
evidence and the intermediate court affirmed. 23 On appeal, the New
Jersey Supreme Court saw the issue as one of duty and concluded that
product safety was principally the manufacturer's concern and that it
should not be allowed to shift this responsibility to someone further
112. See, e.g., Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1184-85 (5th Cir.
1978); Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384, 386 (3rd Cir. 1978); Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.
Supp. 753, 755 (E.D. Pa. 1971); Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d 281, 282 (N.J. 1972);
Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 504 N.E.2d 772, 775-76 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
113. See, e.g., Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1184; Bexiga, 290 A.2d at 282.
114. See infra note 138 and accompanying text.
115. See infra note 143 and accompanying text.
116. 290 A.2d 281 (N.J. 1972).
117. See OWEN, supra note 25, at 561-62.
118. Bexiga, 290 A.2d at 282.
119. Id. at 282-83.
120. Id. at282.
121. Id. at 283.
122. Id. at 282.
123. Id.
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down the chain of distribution.1 24 The court reasoned that the
manufacturer was generally in the best position to identify and reduce
product-related risks. In the court's view:
The public interest in assuring that safety devices are installed
demands more from the manufacturer than to permit him to leave such
a critical phase of his manufacturing process to the haphazard conduct
of the ultimate purchaser. The only way to be certain that such devices
will be installed on all machines-which clearly the public interest
requires-is to place the duty on the manufacturer where it is feasible
for him to do so.
125
Consequently, the court concluded that the jury could have reasonably
found that the defendant's punch press was defectively designed and that
the trial court erroneously dismissed the plaintiffs case instead of
allowing it to go to the jury.
116
Other courts have endorsed the reasoning of the Bexiga Court and
concluded that a manufacturer should be held liable if the product is
defective when it leaves its possession and that the manufacturer cannot
shift the responsibility for installing safety equipment to the ultimate
purchaser.127 Another group of courts have also refused to allow
manufacturers to delegate the responsibility to install safety equipment
on their products, but have qualified that duty somewhat. 2 8 Thus, in
Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 129 the court held that the manufacturer of a metal
slitting machine had a duty to install a guard in front of the cutters
because the machine was custom built and the plaintiffs employer had
relied on the expertise of the manufacturer's engineers to provide the
proper machine for the job orders the purchaser expected to perform. 3"
Other courts have also concluded that a punch press manufacturer had a
duty to install guards on their products whenever this was feasible. 3 '
124. See id. at 285.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Heckman v. Fed. Press Co., 587 F.2d 612, 616-17 (3d Cir. 1978); Wheeler v.
Standard Tool & Mfg. Co., 359 F. Supp. 298, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), affd, 497 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.
1974); see also Rhoads v. Serv. Mach. Co., 329 F. Supp. 367, 376-77 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Soto v.
E.W. Bliss Div. of Gulf & W. Mfg. Co., 452 N.E.2d 572, 577-78 (I11. App. Ct. 1983);
Christopherson v. Hyster Co., 374 N.E.2d 858, 872 (I11. App. Ct. 1978).
128. See Murphy v. L & J Press Corp., 558 F.2d 407, 410-11 (8th Cir. 1977); Dorsey v. Yoder
Co., 331 F. Supp. 753, 759-60 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd, 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973); Duke v. Gulf &
W. Mfg. Co., 660 S.W.2d 404, 410-11,413 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
129. 331 F. Supp. 753 (E.D. Pa. 1971).
130. See id. at 755-56.
131. See, e.g., Murphy, 558 F.2d at 410-12 (remanding for a new trial to determine the issue of
feasibility); Duke, 660 S.W.2d at 413.
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On the other hand, a significant number of courts have declined to
follow the Bexiga holding. 132 Although these courts have offered various
rationales for their decisions, 133 the most common reasons for
immunizing manufacturers from liability are that: (1) the products are
components rather than finished products; 34 (2) the product is not
unreasonably dangerous when it leaves the manufacturer's control
because it is inoperable at that time; 35 and (3) the products are
multifunctional in nature and, therefore, it is not practical for
manufacturers to install safety devices unless they know the purpose for
which the machines will be used.
136
Under the first approach, the court characterizes the product as
unfinished when it leaves the manufacturer's control. 137 The purchaser
or a third-party completes the manufacturing process and, as such,
assumes responsibility for equipping the product with appropriate safety
devices. 13  Verge v. Ford Motor Co.139 illustrates this approach. The
plaintiff in Verge was a member of a garbage collection crew and was
injured when their garbage truck backed into him. 40 The truck's cab and
chassis were manufactured by Ford, but another party, Elgin-Leach Co.
("Leach"), added a compactor and other equipment in order to enable the
vehicle to operate as a garbage collection truck. 14 1 Verge brought suit
against both Ford and Leach, arguing that the vehicle's design was
defective because, inter alia, the defendants failed to equip it with a
back-up buzzer or other device that would warn members of the garbage
collection crew that the garbage truck was reversing. 141
The plaintiff settled with Leach before trial and the jury held in
favor of Verge in his suit against Ford. 43 On appeal, a federal circuit
court observed that the question was "whether the responsibility for
132. See, e.g., Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1190 (5th Cir. 1978);
Verge v. Ford Motor Co., 581 F.2d 384, 386-87 (3d Cir. 1978); Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press
Co., 504 N.E.2d 772, 776 (I1. App. Ct. 1987).
133. See Powell v. E.W. Bliss Co., 529 F. Supp. 48, 53-54 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (compliance with
industry standards or trade custom); Jimenez v. Gulf& W. Mfg. Co., 458 So. 2d 58, 60 & n.3 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1984) (superseding cause).
134. See, e.g., Verge, 581 F.2d at 386-87, 389.
135. See, e.g., Bautista, 504 N.E.2d at 776.
136. See, e.g., Gordon, 574 F.2d at 1190.
137. See Verge, 581 F.2d at 386-87; Christner v. E. W. Bliss Co., 524 F. Supp. 1122, 1125
(M.D. Pa. 1981); Powell v. E. W. Bliss Co., 529 F. Supp. 48,52 (E.D. Pa. 1981).
138. See Verge, 581 F.2d at 387, 389; Christner, 524 F. Supp. at 1125; Powell, 529 F. Supp. at
51-52; Fredericks v. Gen. Motors Corp., 311 N.W.2d 725, 727-28 (Mich. 1981).
139. 581 F.2d 384 (3d Cir. 1978).
140. Id. at 385.
141. Id. at 387.
142. Id. at 385-86.
143. Id. at 386.
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installing such a device should be placed solely upon the company that
manufactured the cab and chassis [i.e., Ford], or solely upon the
company who modified the chassis by adding the compactor unit [i.e.,
Leach] or upon both." 144 To answer this question, the court considered
three factors: (1) trade custom as to what stage in the manufacturing
process the safety device in question would be installed; (2) the relative
expertise of the parties with respect to the relevant design and safety
issues; and (3) the stage of the manufacturing process at which it was
most feasible to install such a safety device.
45
As far as the first factor was concerned, the only evidence presented
at trial was a statement by David Leach that in his experience safety
devices were generally installed by the truck manufacturer. 46 However,
he did not express any opinion about the practice of the garbage truck
industry generally.147 Consequently, the court concluded that there was
no basis for assuming that the industry custom was for the manufacturer
to delegate this responsibility to others. 48 On the other hand, the court
determined that the second factor favored Ford because Leach had more
expertise than Ford about the design of garbage trucks. 49 Finally, the
court determined that it was more practical for Leach to install warning
devices on the final product than Ford.150 As the court observed, the
Ford cab and chassis were designed for multi-purpose uses and many of
these uses would not require a backup buzzer.' 51 Therefore, it would not
be efficient for Ford to install these warning devices on all of its
vehicles. 52 Since two of the three factors supported imposing a duty on
Leach rather than Ford, the court held that Ford should not be held liable
for Verge's injuries.
153
A second theory is that an unfinished product is not unreasonably
dangerous when it leaves the manufacturer's possession because it is
inoperable and, therefore, incapable of causing harm in that condition.
54
Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co. 155 provides a good example of this
reasoning. The plaintiff in Bautista was injured while operating a brake
144. Id.
145. Id. at 387.
146. Id. at 387-88.
147. Id. at 388.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 389.
153. Id.
154. See, e.g., Bautista v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 504 N.E.2d 772, 776 (I11. App. Ct. 1987).
155. 504 N.E.2d 772 (I11. App. Ct. 1987).
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press. 156 The plaintiff alleged that the machine was defective because it
had no safety devices at the point of operation when it was sold to his
employer by the manufacturer.157 However, the court concluded that
because the brake press was delivered to the plaintiff's employer without
any dies, it had no point of operation to be guarded against."'
Consequently, the court affirmed a jury verdict in favor of the defendant
manufacturer. 5 9
Another approach is to distinguish between products that are
"unifunctional" or "single-purpose" and those that are "multifunctional"
or "multi-purpose" in nature. 160 The idea behind this approach is that the
manufacturer of a unifunctional machine knows how it will be used and,
therefore, can incorporate appropriate safety devices into the machine's
design.' 61 In contrast, when a machine is multifunctional, the
manufacturer will probably not know in advance how it will be used
and, therefore, should not be required to install safety devices that may
interfere with efficient operation of the machine.1
62
The court adopted this rationale in an early case, Gordon v.
Niagara Machine & Tool Works.1 63 The plaintiff in Gordon was injured
while operating a punch press manufactured by the defendant. 64 The
accident occurred when the press cycled unexpectedly while being
manually operated. 65 Because the press was designed for multiple uses,
it was sold without dies and without guards or other safety equipment. 166
Although the plaintiffs employer installed a two-palm system for
manual operation, this safety device provided no protection against a
repeat stroke. 167 The plaintiff sued Niagara Machine and Tool Works,
claiming that the punch press was sold in a defective condition. 68 On
156. Id. at 774.
157. Id. at 775. The point of operation is the area between the ram die and the bed die. Id. at
774.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 776.
160. See Gordon v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 574 F.2d 1182, 1190 (5th Cir. 1978).
161. See Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 1984).
162. See Johnson v. Niagara Mach. & Tool Works, 555 So. 2d 88, 92 (Ala. 1989); Savage Mfg.
& Sales, Inc. v. Doser, 540 N.E.2d 402, 404 (I11. App. Ct. 1989); Villar v. E.W. Bliss Co., 350
N.W.2d 920, 922 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984); Westbrock v. Marshalltown Mfg. Co., 473 N.W.2d 352,
356 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); but see Scott v. Dreis & Krump Mfg. Co., 326 N.E.2d 74, 84-85 (I11.
App. Ct. 1975) (holding the manufacturer liable for failing to provide a guard for a foot pedal
because it was not part of the multifunctional nature of the machine).
163. 574 F.2d 1182 (5th Cir. 1978).
164. Id. at 1184.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1184-85.
167. Id. at 1185.
168. Id. at 1189-90.
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appeal, a federal appeals court concluded that the punch press was not
defectively designed merely because it was marketed without any safety
devices.' 69 Rejecting the reasoning of the Bexiga Court, the court in
Gordon declared that the duty to install safety equipment should be
placed on the purchaser rather than the manufacturer of the punch
press. 170 The court observed that because the press was designed for
many kinds of operations, it was up to the purchaser to choose the kinds
of safety devices that were most appropriate for the machine's intended
use.
17 1
While some courts continue to impose liability on a manufacturer
who relies on the purchaser to install safety equipment on the product,
the modem trend is to allow a manufacturer to delegate this
responsibility under certain circumstances. 172 One group of courts
follows the reasoning of Verge and permits such delegation when they
conclude that the item is a component rather than a finished product,
particularly if it is nonfunctional when it leaves the original
manufacturer's possession.' Others require the manufacturer to install
appropriate safety equipment when the product can only be used for one
purpose, but to allow the manufacturer of a multifunction product to
shift the responsibility for installing safety devices to the purchaser who
will know how the product will be used. 174
IV. OPTIONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT FOR COMMERCIAL AND
INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTS
This portion of the Article considers whether manufacturers of
commercial or industrial products can offer safety equipment as an
option instead of providing it as standard equipment. The same issue will
be discussed in connection with consumer products in Part V. Some
courts impose liability on the manufacturer if they determine that a
product was defective or unreasonably dangerous as sold (without
optional safety devices), taking into account the uses to which it would
normally be put. 75 A second group looks to see whether the
manufacturer or the purchaser has superior knowledge about the work
environment in which the product will be used. 176 Finally, other courts
169. Id. at 1190.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 132-36 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 160-71 and accompanying text.
175. See infra Part [V.A.
176. See infra Part IV.B.
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hold manufacturers of unifunctional products liable for failing to install
necessary safety devices as standard equipment, but allow manufacturers
of multifunctional products to escape liability if they offer safety
equipment on an optional basis.
177
A. Defective as Sold
Courts in the first category look to whether the product is defective
or unreasonably dangerous without optional safety devices, taking into
account the uses to which it would normally be put. 178 Caterpillar
Tractor Co. v. Ford179 provides a good illustration of this approach. In
Caterpillar, the plaintiff was killed when a tractor he was driving rolled
over and crushed him.' 80 The decedent's widow sued, arguing that the
tractor was defective because it was not equipped with a rollover
protective structure ("ROPS"). 181 At trial, the evidence showed that
Caterpillar offered a ROPS as optional equipment, but that the
decedent's employer had declined to purchase it.182 The jury held in
favor of the plaintiff) 83 On appeal, Caterpillar argued that it was unjust
to impose liability for not installing a ROPS when it offered this safety
device as optional equipment. 184 In response, the Alabama Supreme
Court declared: "We cannot agree. If the tractor was defective in the
condition in which it was sold, liability for resulting injury cannot be
escaped by showing that the customer could have but did not buy an
item which would have removed the defect.' ' 185 Accordingly, the court
affirmed the lower court's decision in the plaintiffs favor.
186
A federal district court followed a similar approach in Tannebaum
v. Yale Materials Handling Corp.,187 but concluded that the product was
177. See infra Part IV.C.
178. See, e.g., Pahuta v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 170 F.3d 125, 133 (2d Cir. 1999); Nettles v.
Electrolux Motor AB, 784 F.2d 1574, 1578-80 (11th Cir. 1986); Tannebaum v. Yale Materials
Handling Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 425, 433 (D. Md. 1999); Beron v. Kramer-Trenton Co., 402 F.
Supp. 1268, 1270-71, 1277 (E.D. Pa. 1975); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So. 2d 854, 857
(Ala. 1981); Dean v. Toyota Indus. Equip. Mfg., Inc., 540 S.E.2d 233, 237 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000);
Pigliavento v. Tyler Equip. Corp., 669 N.Y.S.2d 747, 748-49 (App. Div. 1998); Coleman v. Cintas
Sales Corp., 40 S.W.3d 544, 548-49 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
179. 406 So. 2d 854 (Ala. 1981).
180. Id. at 855.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 856.
183. Id. at 855.
184. Id. at 857.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 859.
187. 38 F. Supp. 2d 425 (D. Md. 1999).
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not defective as sold. 188 In Tannebaum, a supermarket employee was
injured while operating a forklift to lift bales of cardboard boxes into a
trailer. 189 The cardboard bales were loaded in such a way that the
topmost bale exceeded the height of the forklift's "load backrest,"
thereby allowing the 700-pound bale to fall into the operator's
compartment. 190  The cardboard bale fell into the operator's
compartment, struck him in the head, and knocked him out of the
forklift.'91 The heavy bale then fell on him, injuring his legs. 1
92
At the time the forklift was purchased by the plaintiffs employer,
buyers could select a number of safety devices to install on it, depending
on the machine's intended use. 193 Among the options that the plaintiffs
employer declined to purchase was a side entry modification with a rear
guard and a wire mesh overhead covering. 194 The plaintiff sued the
manufacturer, Yale, alleging that the forklift was defectively designed
because it did not have these safety features. 95 He also claimed that the
forklift was defective because it did not have a rear door-a safety
feature that was not available as an option at the time. 196 After discovery
was completed, Yale moved for summary judgment.197 The federal
district court, applying Maryland law, granted the defendant's motion,
concluding that the forklift was not defectively designed.' 98
In its analysis of the plaintiffs design defect claim, the court
rejected the defendant's contention that the consumer expectation test
should be used and instead applied the risk-utility test as suggested by
the plaintiff. 99 Nevertheless, the court found that most of the factors
involved in its risk-utility analysis, as identified by a federal appeals
court Binakonsky v. Ford Motor Co.,20 0 weighed overwhelmingly in
favor of the defendant.20 ' In particular, the court emphasized that the
safety options suggested by the plaintiff would either increase the size of
the forklift, and thereby diminish its ability to operate in a narrow-aisle
188. Id. at433,435.
189. Id. at 426-27.
190. Id. at 427.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 428.
194. Id.
195. Id. at 430.
196. Id. at428,430.
197. See id. at 426.
198. Id. at426,435.
199. Id. at431.
200. 133 F.3d 281 (4th Cir. 1998).
201. Tannebaum, 38 F. Supp. 2d at 431-33 (citation omitted). See also Binakonsky, 133 F.3d at
285-89.
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environment, or they would create new hazards by obstructing the
operator's view.202 For these reasons, the court concluded that the
forklift was not defectively designed.2 3
B. Superior Knowledge
A second approach focuses on the respective knowledge of the
purchaser and the manufacturer.20 4 Not surprisingly, most of the courts
that have engaged in this type of analysis have concluded that the
purchaser's knowledge is superior to that of the manufacturer and have
allowed the manufacturer to delegate the responsibility for choosing
safety equipment. 20 5 Biss v. Tenneco, Inc.20 6 is one of the leading
proponents of this approach.20 7 The decedent in that case ran off the road
while driving a loader and struck a telephone pole.20 8 The vehicle in
question had been purchased by Vincent Centers, the decedent's
employer, for use in his logging business.20 9 The decedent's personal
representative brought suit against the manufacturer of the logger,
alleging that it was defectively designed because it was not equipped
with a ROPS.210 However, the lower court dismissed the case and this
decision was affirmed on appeal.11
The parties agreed that defendant, Tenneco, offered a ROPS,
manufactured by another vendor, as optional equipment.212 The court
ruled that the manufacturer fulfilled its duty by offering to provide a
ROPS on an optional basis. 21 3 The court reasoned that the possibility of a
rollover was not an inherent danger of operating the loader, but was
associated with the particular job and the work site.214 Consequently, the
manufacturer would have no way to know in advance whether it was
202. Id. at 432-33.
203. Id. at 435.
204. See, e.g., Austin v. Clark Equip. Co., 48 F.3d 833, 836 (4th Cir. 1995); Scallan v. Duriron
Co., 11 F.3d 1249, 1254 (5th Cit. 1994); Derrick v. Yoder Co., 410 N.E.2d 1030, 1038 (I11. App. Ct.
1980); Jackson v. Bomag GmbH, 638 N.Y.S.2d 819, 823 (App. Div. 1996); Fallon v. Clifford B.
Hannay & Son, Inc., 550 N.Y.S.2d 135, 136 (App. Div. 1989); Biss v. Tenneco, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d
874, 876-77 (App. Div. 1978); Banzhafv. ADT Sec. Sys. Sw., Inc., 28 S.W.3d 180, 187 (Tex. Ct.
App. 2000).
205. See, e.g., Austin, 48 F.3d at 837; Scallan, 11 F.3d at 1254; Jackson, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 823;
Fallon, 550 N.Y.S.2d at 137, 139; Banzhaf, 28 S.W.3d at 187.
206. 409 N.Y.S.2d 874 (App. Div. 1978).
207. Id. at 876-77.
208. Id. at 875.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 876 (noting that the appellate court affirmed the dismissal on other grounds).
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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cost-effective to install a ROPS on any particular vehicle.215 According
to the court:
If knowledge of available safety options is brought home to the
purchaser, the duty to exercise reasonable care in selecting those
appropriate to the intended use rests upon him. He is the party in the
best position to exercise an intelligent judgment to make the trade-off
between cost and function, and it is he who should bear the
responsibility if the decision on optional safety equipment presents an
unreasonable risk to users.
216
Because the rollover risk was job and site specific, the purchaser, rather
than the manufacturer, was in the best position to identify a product-
related risk and take cost-effective measures to reduce or eliminate it.
217
The Biss Court also expressed concern that holding the
manufacturer and others in the distributive chain liable for failing to
provide a ROPS as standard equipment under these circumstances would
impose an unreasonable burden on them and unnecessarily increase the
cost of their products:
To hold otherwise casts the manufacturer and supplier in the role of
insurers answerable to injured parties in any event, because the
purchaser of the equipment for his own reasons, economic or
otherwise, elects not to purchase available options to ensure safety.
The "legal responsibility, if any, for injury caused by machinery which
has possible dangers incident to its use should be shouldered by the
one in the best position to have eliminated those dangers."
2 18
Accordingly, the court in Bliss affirmed the lower court's decision in
favor of the manufacturer.219
The Texas Court of Appeals in Banzhaf v. ADT Security Systems
Southwest, Inc.220 followed the Biss Court's approach, holding that the
plaintiffs' employer was in the best position to decide which features to
include in the security system that it purchased from the defendant
221 tamanufacturer. In that case, one employee was killed and another
severely wounded during a robbery at Herman's Sporting Goods
("Herman's"), where they worked.222 In their suit against ADT, the
provider of the store's security system, the plaintiffs alleged that the
215. Id. at 876-77.
216. Id.
217. Seeid. at877.
218. Id. (quoting Micallefv. Miehle Co., 348 N.E.2d 571, 578 (N.Y. 1976)).
219. Id.
220. 28 S.W.3d 180 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
221. Id. at 187.
222. Id. at 183.
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alarm system was defectively designed because it did not have a "duress
223code" as standard equipment. A duress code enables the user of a
security system to silently trigger an alarm while being held hostage or
otherwise endangered.224
Although ADT offered a duress code feature as an option,
Herman's did not choose to purchase it. 225 There were two reasons why
Herman's declined to incorporate this feature into its security system.
First, the system was designed to be activated only when the store was
closed and no employees were present.226 Second, Herman's considered
the duress code feature to be potentially dangerous to its employees.227
Instead, the store's written security policy directed employees not to
resist or endanger themselves during a robbery attempt.228 The plaintiffs,
on the other hand, contended that ADT should have included the duress
code as a standard feature rather than an optional one.229 In fact, their
expert witness went so far as to compare a duress code to an airbag in an
automobile, maintaining that it was a safety feature that no responsible
manufacturer would fail to install as standard equipment.
However, the Texas Court of Appeals refused to treat the duress
code as a safer alternative design under the circumstances of this case,
but instead deferred to Herman's judgment about the nature of its
security system.2 According to the court:
The deterrence of crime involves many complex issues. Herman's
adopted a policy of refusing the duress code because it believed that
the use of the duress code might endanger employees. Herman's
selected a security system to protect its property when its employees
were not there. We refuse to abrogate a store owner's right to select the
security devices and services that it deems best to protect its property
or its employees. We find, as a matter of law, that plaintiffs have
shown no defectively designed product in this case.232
Thus, the court affirmed the lower court's judgment in favor of ADT on
233this issue.
223. Id. at 183, 187.
224. Id. at 183.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 184.
227. Id. at 184 n.2.
228. Id.
229. Id. at 187.
230. See id.
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
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C. Single-Purpose Versus Multi-Purpose Use Products
A third approach gives considerable weight to the distinction
between single-purpose and multi-purpose products.234 Under this
approach, manufacturers are required to install safety devices as standard
equipment on unifunctional products because they know the purposes
for which they will be used and the work environment in which they will
235operate. However, manufacturers are given more leeway to offer
safety equipment on an optional basis when the product can be used for
236more than one purpose.
One of the first cases to distinguish between unifunctional and
multifunctional products was Turney v. Ford Motor Co.2 37 The plaintiff
in Turney was injured while mowing grass when his tractor struck a
hidden burl and overturned.238 Turney sued the tractor's manufacturer,
Ford, alleging that the tractor was unreasonably dangerous because it did
not have a roll bar and seat belt system, known as ROPS.23 9 The jury
found in favor of Ford and the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the trial
court should not have permitted the defendant to offer evidence about
the availability of a ROPS as optional equipment. 40
On appeal, an Illinois court acknowledged that as a general rule, a
manufacturer must design a reasonably safe product and may not
delegate that duty to a dealer or to the purchaser of the product.241
However, the court explained that the tractor was multifunctional and
was sold for use in a variety of workplace environments, including dairy
and cattle farms, factory yards, and greenhouses, whose low clearances
made it impracticable for the manufacturer to install roll bars as standard
equipment.242 Consequently, the manufacturer could introduce evidence
of the multifunctional nature of a product as a factor for the jury to
consider in its determination of whether a product was unreasonably
dangerous.243 It also concluded that the availability of a ROPS as
optional equipment was related to the multifunctional nature of the
product and, therefore, was probative as to whether the tractor was
234. See, e.g., Tumey v. Ford Motor Co., 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1083 (Il. App. Ct. 1981); Bilotta
v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 1984).
235. See Turney, 418 N.E.2d at 1083; Bilotta, 346 N.W.2d at 624.
236. See, e.g., Bexiga v. Havir Mfg. Corp., 290 A.2d 281, 284 (N.J. 1972).
237. 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981).
238. Id. at 1082.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 1081.
241. Id. at 1083 (citations omitted).
242. Id.
243. Id.
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unreasonably dangerous.244 Accordingly, the court affirmed the lower
court's judgment in favor of Ford.245
In contrast, the Minnesota Supreme Court in Bilotta v. Kelley Co.
24 6
held the manufacturer of a mechanical dockboard liable for injuries to a
warehouse employee after concluding that the product was not
multifunctional in nature.247 The defendant's dockboards were employed
to bridge the gap between a carrier, such as a truck-trailer, and a loading
dock.248 Forklift trucks would be used to transfer goods from the carrier
across the dockboard ramp to the warehouse.249 It was possible to raise
or lower the ramp mechanically to accommodate differences in height
between the carrier and the loading dock.5 ° When in use, one end of the
dockboard was supported only by the carrier.25  To prevent the
dockboard from falling if the carrier pulled or rolled away, the
manufacturer offered a fixed-leg safety system and a cross-traffic leg
system that would support the dockboard if this occurred.252 In addition,
it offered a panic stop as a $200 option in connection with the cross-
traffic leg system.253 The panic stop was designed to sense if the ramp
was falling too fast and stop it.254 The plaintiffs employer purchased a
dockboard without the optional panic stop device.
5
The accident occurred when a forklift truck became stuck with its
right wheels on the dock and its left wheels on the ramp.256 In order to
free the forklift, the driver of the truck-trailer pulled away from the dock,
thereby removing the dockboard's support and causing the ramp under
the weight of the forklift to fall to its lowest position.257 The forklift then
tipped over and pinned the plaintiff by the neck against a doorjamb,
depriving his brain of oxygen long enough to cause permanent brain
damage.258 In his lawsuit against the manufacturer of the dockboard, the
plaintiff contended that the product was unreasonably dangerous because
244. Id.
245. Id. at 1087.
246. 346 N.W.2d 616 (Minn. 1984).
247. Id. at 624.
248. Id. at 619.
249. Id.
250. Id.
251. Id.
252. Id. at619-20.
253. Id. at 620.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. Id.
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it was sold without a panic button.259 The jury awarded the plaintiff $2.3
million.260
On appeal, the manufacturer urged the court to adopt a rule that
provided that the offer of an optional safety device by the manufacturer
to a knowledgeable purchaser passes to that purchaser the risk of loss
from use of the product if he or she declines to purchase the safety
device in question.26' However, the court pointed out that the
defendant's proposed rule would apply to products that were not
multifunctional and whose functions would not be impaired if an
optional safety device was installed as standard equipment. 262 The court
also observed that the defendant's approach would allow manufacturers
to circumvent their duty to provide reasonably safe products by
marketing dangerous "stripped down" machines instead.263 In this case,
the court found that the dockboard was not multifunctional and that the
panic stop device would not have impaired its function.26 In addition,
even if providing a particular safety device as standard equipment would
cost the manufacturer more money, take more time, or decrease sales, it
should not operate as a complete defense, but should only be considered
as a factor within the balancing approach used by the jury to determine if
the product was defective or unreasonably dangerous when it left the
manufacturer's control.265 Unfortunately for the plaintiff, the court
concluded that the trial court had incorrectly instructed the jury on the
proper test for design defects, reversed the lower court's judgment, and
ordered a new trial on the issue of liability.
266
D. The Scarangella Approach
Finally, in recent years, the New York courts have developed a rule
that incorporates some aspects of the other approaches discussed
above.267 This rule was first enunciated in 1999 by the New York Court
of Appeals in Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc.268 The plaintiff in
259. See id.
260. Id. at 619.
261. Id. at 624.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 624-25 (internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Id. at 624.
265. Id.
266. Id. at 623, 625.
267. See, e.g., Passante v. Agway Consumer Prods., Inc., 909 N.E.2d 563, 566-67 (N.Y. 2009);
Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 683 (N.Y. 1999); Beemer v. Deere & Co.,
794 N.Y.S.2d 253, 254 (App. Div. 2005); Bova v. Caterpillar, Inc., 761 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86-87 (App.
Div. 2003); Geddes v. Crown Equip. Corp., 709 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (App. Div. 2000).
268. 717 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. 1999).
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that case, a school bus driver, was struck and injured on his employer's
premises by another school bus that was backing up. 2 69 The
manufacturer of the school bus offered a back-up alarm as an optional
safety feature. 270 The alarm was designed to automatically sound
whenever the bus driver shifted into reverse gear.27' However, the
plaintiffs employer, Huntington Coach Corporation ("Huntington"),
declined to purchase it for any of the buses that it acquired from Thomas
Built Buses in 1988.272
The plaintiff based her design defect case on the proposition that a
manufacturer should install a back-up alarm system as standard
equipment because a blind spot always existed when the vehicle was
operated in reverse.273 The plaintiff also contended that the bus was
defectively designed because it did not have proper mirrors.274 The trial
court refused to allow the plaintiff to submit evidence on the absence of
a back-up alarm system and directed a verdict in favor of the defendant
on the mirror issue.275 The New York Court of Appeals declared that
three factors must exist in order for a manufacturer to shift the
responsibility for determining product safety to the purchaser:
The product is not defective where the evidence and reasonable
inferences therefrom show that: (1) the buyer is thoroughly
knowledgeable regarding the product and its use and is actually aware
that the safety feature is available; (2) there exist normal circumstances
of use in which the product is not unreasonably dangerous without the
optional equipment; and (3) the buyer is in a position, given the range
of uses of the product, to balance the benefits and the risks of not
having the safety device in the specifically contemplated circumstances
of the buyer's use of the product.
276
According to the court, when these factors are present, the buyer is in a
better position to evaluate the costs and benefits assessment of an
optional safety device.277 On the other hand, when these factors are not
present, strict liability is appropriate because the manufacturer is in the
best position to discover and prevent design defects.278
269. Id. at 680.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. Id. at681.
274. Id.
275. Id.
276. Id. at 683.
277. Id.
278. Id. (citation omitted).
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Applying this analysis to the facts in Scarangella, the court
concluded that all of the enumerated factors were present. First,
Huntington had owned and operated school buses for many years and,
therefore, was a highly knowledgeable buyer.279 Second, because bus
drivers employed other tactics to compensate for the blind spot, the risk
of harm from the absence of a back-up alarm was not significant.28°
Finally, Huntington was in a better position than the defendant to
evaluate the risks of not using a back-up alarm system, given the
foreseeable uses of the bus.281 Since the plaintiff failed to submit any
proof to negate these factors, the court affirmed the lower court's
judgment in favor of the defendant.282
A number of New York intermediate appellate courts have
followed the Scarangella Court's approach in recent years.283 In most
cases, this has resulted in a decision for the defendant.284 Thus, for
example, several courts have relied on Scarangella to exonerate forklift
manufacturers who offered back-up alarms as optional instead of
285installing them as standard equipment. In another case, an appellate
court reversed a ruling for a restaurant worker who was scalded while
carrying a container of hot grease to a disposal receptacle.286 The court
applied the Scarangella factors to conclude that the fryer was not
unreasonably dangerous because the manufacturer offered an optional,
wheeled, disposal unit in order to transport hot grease more safely
instead of including it as standard equipment.
287
On the other hand, several courts have found in the plaintiffs
favor.2 88 For example, in Beemer v. Deere & Co.,289 the plaintiff was
injured while operating a tractor with a backhoe attachment. 29° He hit theback of his head and neck against the roll guard when the tractor
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. at 683-84.
282. Id. at 684.
283. See, e.g., Cordani v. Thompson & Johnson Equip. Co., 792 N.Y.S.2d 675, 677 (App. Div.
2005); Bova v. Caterpillar, Inc., 761 N.Y.S.2d 85, 86-87 (App. Div. 2003); Geddes v. Crown Equip.
Corp., 709 N.Y.S.2d 770, 771 (App. Div. 2000).
284. See, e.g., Cordani, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 677, 679-80; Bova, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87; Geddes,
709 N.Y.S.2d at 771.
285. See, e.g., Cordani, 792 N.Y.S.2d at 677; Bova, 761 N.Y.S.2d at 86-87; Geddes, 709
N.Y.S.2d at 771.
286. See Warlikowski v. Burger King Corp., 780 N.Y.S.2d 608, 610 (App. Div. 2004).
287. Id.
288. See, e.g., Campbell v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (App. Div.
2006); Beemer v. Deere & Co., 794 N.Y.S.2d 253,254-55 (App. Div. 2005).
289. 794 N.Y.S.2d 253 (App. Div. 2005).
290. Id. at 254.
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"jarred" unexpectedly. 29' The plaintiff contended that the tractor was
defectively designed because it was not equipped with a taller roll
guard.292 In reply, the manufacturer pointed out that its dealer had
offered to install a taller roll guard as optional equipment, but that the
plaintiffs employer had declined to purchase it.293 The trial court
granted the manufacturer's motion for summary judgment.294 However,
the appeals court reversed, finding that the manufacturer had not offered
sufficient proof that all three Scarangella factors were met to justify a
summary judgment in its favor.2 95
More recently, the Court of Appeals upheld the denial of a
manufacturer's motion for summary judgment in Passante v. Agway
Consumer Products, Inc.29 6 In Passante, a worker was injured while
using a mechanical dock leveler at his employer's warehouse.297 The
plaintiff was "walking down" the dock leveler in order to ensure that the
platform was resting on the tractor trailer that he was unloading.298 As he
was performing this task, the tractor trailer pulled away before the
platform was properly secured, causing it to fall back to a pendent
position.299 This caused Passante to fall onto a cement and steel grate
300below, resulting in serious injury.
The manufacturer offered an optional safety device called a "Dok-
Lok" that was designed to warn workers when they could safely enter
the trailer.30 1 However, the plaintiffs employer declined to purchase this
device because it would require an additional worker to operate it.302 The
plaintiff sued both Rite-Hite, the manufacturer of the dock leveler, and
Mullen Industrial Handling Corp. ("Mullen"), the seller of the dock
leveler, claiming that the dock leveler was defectively designed because
it was not equipped with a warning device such as the Dok-Lok.303 The
trial court refused to grant Mullen's motion for summary judgment.304 A
New York appellate division court reversed and dismissed the plaintiffs
291. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
292. See id.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 254-55.
296. 909 N.E.2d 563, 566, 568 (N.Y. 2009).
297. Id. at 563.
298. Id. at 564 (internal quotation marks omitted).
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at 563-65.
304. Id. at 566.
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lawsuit.30 5 On appeal before the New York Court of Appeals, both the
manufacturer and seller relied on the reasoning of the Scarangella
case. 30 6 The court acknowledged that Scarangella's first requirement
was met since the plaintiffs employer was familiar with dock levelers
and was aware that the Dok-Lok was available as optional equipment.30 7
However, the court concluded that summary judgment for the defendants
was not warranted because they had not shown that the dock leveler
could normally be used in circumstances in which it was not
unreasonably dangerous without a trailer restraint or warning system
such as a Dok-Lok.3°8
V. OPTIONAL SAFETY EQUIPMENT AND CONSUMER PRODUCTS
As the foregoing discussion suggests, courts seem willing in many
cases to allow purchasers to make safety decisions about industrial or
commercial products. But are they also willing to permit retail
consumers to make the same sort of decisions about household or
recreational products? Surprisingly, there are relatively few appellate
court cases on this issue. However, what little case law there is suggests
that courts tend to follow the same approaches as they do in the
industrial machinery cases. 30 9 That is to say, they focus on such factors
as: (1) the condition of the product as sold; (2) whether the consumer has
superior knowledge about the intended use of the product and the risks
associated with this use; and (3) whether the product is a single-purpose
product or whether it has multiple uses. Finally, some courts employ the
Scarangella case's multi-factor approach.
305. Passante v. Agway Consumer Prods., Inc., 741 N.Y.S.2d 624, 625-26 (App. Div. 2002),
modified and aff'd, 909 N.E.2d 563 (N.Y. 2009).
306. Passante, 909 N.E.2d at 566.
307. Id. at 567.
308. Id. at 567-68.
309. Compare Miller v. Dvomik, 501 N.E.2d 160, 163-64 (11. App. Ct. 1986) (applying the
condition as sold test in a retail consumer case), with Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So. 2d
854, 857 (Ala. 1981) (applying the condition as sold test in an industrial machinery case); compare
Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 480, 483 (App. Div. 1981), aff'd 434 N.E.2d 1345
(N.Y. 1982) (applying the superior knowledge test in a retail consumer case), with Biss v. Tenneco,
Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (App. Div. 1978) (applying the superior knowledge test in an
industrial machinery case); compare Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Kunze, 996 S.W.2d 416, 422 (Tex.
App. 1999) (applying the multiple use test in a retail consumer case), with Tumey v. Ford Motor
Co., 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1083 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (applying the multiple use test in an industrial
machinery case); compare Campbell v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 188, 189 (App.
Div. 2006) (applying the Scarangella test in a retail consumer case), with Scarangella v. Thomas
Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 683 (setting forth the Scarangella test in an industrial machinery
case).
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A. Defective as Sold
The first group of cases ignores the availability of optional safety
devices and instead focuses on the condition of the product as sold.
Miller v. Dvornik31 exemplifies this approach. In Miller, a nineteen-
year-old plaintiff was injured when his motorcycle was struck by an
automobile.311  He brought a strict liability claim against the
manufacturer, Yamaha Motor Corporation ("Yamaha"), and its dealer,
Performance Center ("Performance"), alleging that the motorcycle was
unreasonably dangerous because it was not equipped with safety crash
bars.31 2 Yamaha apparently did offer these crash bars as an optional
feature.313 Performance moved to dismiss the strict liability claim
pursuant to a state statute that protected retail sellers against liability in
certain circumstances; the court granted the motion and the plaintiff
appealed.314 In affirming the lower court's ruling, the appeals court
observed that the appropriate test for liability was the consumer
expectation test.315 Thus, a seller would be held liable only if the product
was "dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated
by the ordinary person with ordinary knowledge common to the
community.,
316
The court also declared that the availability of optional safety
devices was not relevant to whether the product as sold was
unreasonably dangerous:
Because the focus in determining whether a product is unreasonably
dangerous is on the product itself, not on available safety devices, the
pivotal question is whether the product in its present state, without
installation of optional safety devices, is dangerous because it fails to
perform in the manner reasonably to be expected in light of its nature
and intended function.
317
Finally, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim that he could not be
expected to be aware of the danger of riding a motorcycle without crash
bars because he was young and inexperienced.31 8 According to the court,
any competent motorcyclist should know that he or she might be thrown
off the vehicle if it were struck by an automobile or the vehicle might
310. 501 N.E.2d 160 (Il1. App. Ct. 1986).
311. Id. at 162.
312. Id. at 161-62.
313. Id. at 162.
314. Id. at 162-63.
315. Id. at 163-64.
316. Id. at 163 (citations omitted).
317. Id. at 163-64 (citations omitted).
318. Id. at 164.
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topple over onto the driver.319 Furthermore, the average motorcyclist
would also know that crash bars would not provide any protection if the
driver were thrown off the vehicle, but it would protect against injury if
the motorcycle toppled over as the result of a collision.320 Concluding
that the plaintiff's injuries were caused by the inherent propensities of
the product, the court held that the lower court was correct in its
determination that the motorcycle was not unreasonably dangerous.321
There have also been a few reported cases involving optional safety
equipment on motor vehicles. For example, in Gross ex rel. Gross v.
Running,322 the driver of a Ford F-150 pickup truck was injured while
towing another vehicle. 323 Ford sold the F-150 for off-road use and
advertised these vehicles as "'all-out tough' four wheelers. 324 The
plaintiff acquired the truck in question for off-road use, but declined to
purchase an optional rear bumper because he wished to install his own
custom bumper on the vehicle.325 The accident occurred when the
truck's frame rail gave way, allowing a tow hook to strike the
plaintiff.326 The plaintiff brought suit against Ford, alleging that the
manufacturer knew that F-i 50s would be used for off-road use and that
it should have provided for safe attachment of a tow hook on the truck's
back end.327 Although the plaintiff's suit against Ford resulted in a jury
verdict in his favor, the trial court granted a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict in favor of Ford and the plaintiff appealed.328 On appeal, the
court largely ignored the fact that the plaintiff had declined to purchase
the optional bumper (which presumably would have been better suited
for towing), but instead concluded that the truck as sold was not
unreasonably dangerous. 329 According to the court, the truck's framerail
was strong enough for towing and it was possible to properly install a
tow hook on the vehicle. 330 For these reasons, the court affirmed the
lower court's judgment.33
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. 403 N.W.2d 243 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
323. Id. at 244-45.
324. Id. at 244.
325. Id.
326. Id. at 245.
327. Id. at 246.
328. Id. at 245.
329. See id at 247.
330. Id
331. Id. at 248.
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The product seller also prevailed in McWilliams v. Yamaha Motor
Corp. USA.332 The plaintiff in that case was injured when his motorcycle
was struck by an automobile.333 Although the motorcycle did not include
any lower limb protective guards or crash bars, these safety features
were available as optional equipment.334 In his suit against the
manufacturer, Yamaha, the plaintiff alleged that the motorcycle was
defectively designed because it was not equipped with crash bars.335
Yamaha moved for summary judgment, arguing that it was not liable to
the plaintiff under New Jersey law.336
Ruling for the defendant, a federal district court observed that
Section 3(a) of the New Jersey Products Liability Law 337 provided a
defense to sellers if the dangerous characteristics of their products were
inherent and known to ordinary consumers.3 38 Furthermore, the court
predicted that the New Jersey Supreme Court would probably find that
the risk of lower-leg injury was an open and obvious aspect of operating
a motorcycle.339 Consequently, the court concluded that the motorcycle
in question was not defectively designed even though it did not have
crash bars.340
The manufacturer also prevailed in Morrison v. Kubota Tractor
Corp.341 The decedent in that case was killed when his used four-wheel
model L-235 DT utility tractor rolled over while he was mowing along a
steep slope on his farm.342 The plaintiffs based their design defect claim
on the fact that the tractor was not equipped with a ROPS.343 In this case,
the manufacturer normally installed a ROPS as standard equipment, but
implemented a "delete option" program which allowed customers to sign
a written "ROPS waiver" form attesting that they voluntarily declined to
purchase ROPS after being informed of its availability and safety
advantages. 344 There was no evidence whether the original purchaser
signed this waiver.345 The trial court directed a verdict for the defendant
332. 780 F. Supp. 251, 252 (D.N.J. 1991), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 987 F.2d 200 (3d Cir.
1993).
333. Id.
334. Id. at 253.
335. Id. at 253-54.
336. Id. at 252.
337. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(a)(2) (West 2000).
338. McWilliams, 780 F. Supp at 256-57 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-3(a)(2)).
339. Id. at 260.
340. Id. at 262.
341. 891 S.W.2d 422, 425 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
342. Id. at 423-24.
343. Id. at 424.
344. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
345. Id.
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on the plaintiffs' negligence claim and the jury found in favor of the
defendant on the strict liability claim.346 The plaintiffs appealed the trial
court's decision to direct a verdict on the negligence claim.
3 47
The Missouri Court of Appeals reviewed a number of negligence
cases involving ROPS and concluded that while manufacturers were
generally liable for latent dangerous conditions, they were not
responsible when the danger was open and obvious or when the user was
aware of it.348 Since the decedent was aware of the danger of a rollover,
the court concluded that the manufacturer owed no duty to protect him
against rollover related injuries. 349 Relying on the reasoning of Biss, the
court went on to declare that even if the manufacturer owed a duty to the
decedent, it fulfilled this duty when it advised him that a ROPS could be
purchased as optional equipment.35° Consequently, the appeals court
affirmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the defendant on the
negligence claim.351
On the other hand, in Trull v. Volkswagen of America, Inc.,352 a
federal appeals court held that an automobile manufacturer could not
leave it up to purchasers to decide whether to equip their cars with lap-
shoulder seatbelts.353 One passenger was killed and another was injured
when the plaintiff's vehicle, a 1986 Volkswagen Vanagon, collided with
another motor vehicle.3 54 In his suit against Volkswagen, the plaintiff
alleged that the company was negligent and the Vanagon was defective
because the rear seats were only equipped with lap belts rather than lap-
shoulder belts. 355 The jury found in the defendant's favor on the strict
liability claim, but concluded that Volkswagen was negligent and
316awarded the passengers more than $10 million.
On appeal, the circuit court affirmed the lower court's judgment on
the negligence issue. 357 However, it observed that lap-shoulder seatbelts
were more effective than lap belts alone in restraining forward
movement in automobile collisions.358 The court also noted that
Volkswagen offered lap-shoulder seatbelts as standard equipment in
346. Id. at 425.
347. Id.
348. Id. at 425-27.
349. Id. at 427-28.
350. Id. at 428.
351. Id. at429.
352. 320 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).
353. See id. at 9.
354. Id. at 3.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 9.
358. Id. at 8-9.
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Vanagons that it sold in foreign countries. 359 Although Volkswagen
offered lap-shoulder seatbelts as optional equipment in the United States,
the appeals court agreed with the jury that Volkswagen was negligent in
not offering them as standard equipment in this country.36
Consequently, it affirmed the lower court's judgment.361
B. Superior Knowledge
Several cases have followed the Biss Court's superior knowledge
approach. For example, in Rainbow v. Albert Elia Building Co., 36 2 a
New York court concluded that the purchaser of a motorcycle, not the
manufacturer, was in the best position to decide whether to purchase side
crash bars.363 The plaintiff in Rainbow suffered an injury to his right leg
when he drove his motorcycle onto the shoulder of a narrowed road and
struck the rear of a parked car.364 In his suit against Harley Davidson, the
manufacturer of the motorcycle, the plaintiff claimed that the vehicle
was defectively designed because the manufacturer had failed to install
365side crash bars to protect his legs in the event of an accident.
Affirming the lower court's dismissal of the plaintiffs suit against
the manufacturer, the appeals court stated that some products, like
motorcycles, are inherently dangerous, but they are not unreasonably
dangerous as long as they do not subject the user or consumer to
unexpected hazards.366 Thus, the consumer's knowledge of the risk
played a role in determining whether a manufacturer could offer a safety
device as an option instead of installing it on the product as standard
equipment.367 Citing Biss, the court declared:
In this case we are considering a safety feature that was available as
optional equipment. But plaintiff was an experienced motorcyclist and
he had been a successful motorcycle racer for many years. He testified
that he was familiar with crash bars and their availability and that in
fact he had removed crash bars mounted on a previously owned
motorcycle, finding them dangerous for his needs. Manifestly, he was
in the best position to exercise an intelligent judgment in making the
trade-off between cost and function and thus to decide whether crash
359. Id. at 9.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 10.
362. 436 N.Y.S.2d 480 (App. Div. 1981), aff'd, 434 N.E.2d 1345 (N.Y. 1982).
363. Id. at483.
364. Id. at481.
365. Id.
366. Id. at 483, 485 (citation omitted).
367. Id. at 482-83 (noting that even though there was an evidentiary issue on appeal, the
consumer's knowledge of the risks should be given "proper account").
2011] RISKY BUS1NESS
HOFSTRA LAW REVIEW
bars were reasonably necessary on his motorcycle for his purposes. He
is the person who should have been required to do so.368
Consequently, the appeals court affirmed the lower court's judgment in
favor of Harley Davidson.
3 69
Clemenz v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 370 an unpublished federal
appeals court opinion, also held in favor of the manufacturer. 371 The
plaintiff in Clemenz was injured while operating a table saw
manufactured by Emerson Electric Company and sold by Sears. 372 The
plaintiff claimed that the saw was defective because it was not equipped
with a safety device known as a miter gauge clamp.373 The owner's
manual indicated that this device was available as optional equipment.37a
The lower court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants,
concluding that the plaintiff could not recover if he knew about the
safety purpose of the miter gauge clamp before the accident and failed to
purchase it.375 On appeal, the circuit court agreed with the defendants'
contention that the plaintiff was a sophisticated user and was presumably
aware of the availability and safety benefits of a miter gauge clamp.
376
The appeals court concluded that the plaintiffs decision to forego
purchasing this safety option relieved the defendants from any liability
for failure to provide it as standard equipment.377
The manufacturer also prevailed in Davis v. Caterpillar Tractor
Co. 378 The plaintiff in that case was injured when a dead tree fell on him
while he was operating a D6C track tractor to clear debris on
undeveloped mountain property.379 The plaintiff claimed that the tractor
was defectively designed because it did not have a ROPS. 380 At the time
the plaintiff purchased the tractor, he and the dealer discussed the
possibility of equipping the tractor with either a ROPS or a falling object
protective structure. 38 1 However, the plaintiff decided that he did not
need an overhead protective structure because of the nature of the work
368. Id at 483 (citing Biss v. Tenneco, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (App. Div. 1978)).
369. Id. at 485.
370. No. 92-6068, 1993 WL 26639, at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 3, 1993).
371. Id. at*3.
372. Id. at *1.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at *3.
377. Id.
378. 719 P.2d 324, 328-29 (Colo. App. 1985).
379. Id. at 325.
380. See id. at 326.
381. Id. at 325.
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he intended to perform.382 Nevertheless, the jury awarded $2.5 million in
damages to the plaintiff.383
However, the appeals court reversed, holding that the tractor was
not defectively designed.384 Applying the consumer expectation test, the
court observed that a product was not unreasonably dangerous unless it
was more dangerous than an ordinary consumer would expect it to be.
385
The court went on to declare:
But a product is not "unreasonably dangerous" and, thus, defectively
designed if the consumer deliberately chooses to purchase that which
he, as a reasonable consumer, should have expected was not as safe as
other products on the market. And, if a claim is predicated on a
manufacturer's failure to install an added safety device, strict liability
will not attach simply because a feasible alternative would have
rendered the product safer.
38 6
Citing Biss, the court concluded that the plaintiff should have known that
the tractor he purchased would not be as safe as one equipped with an
optional overhead protective device.387 Since the plaintiff was in the best
position to evaluate and minimize the danger by purchasing this option,
he should bear any loss caused by his failure to do so.
388
C. Single-Purpose Versus Multi-Purpose Use Products
Another group of courts purports to allow manufacturers to provide
optional safety equipment for multi-purpose products, but not for single-
purpose ones. For example, in Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Kunze,389 the
purchaser of a ten-inch radial power saw sued the saw's manufacturer,
Emerson, and retail seller, Sears, alleging that the saw was defectively
designed because it was not equipped with a lower blade guard. 390 There
was evidence that a lower blade guard might have been available, but
that it would not have been easy to obtain for this particular model.39' At
trial, the jury concluded that the defendants were negligent and its
verdict was affirmed on appeal.3 92 The defendants argued that because
382. Id.
383. Id. at 326.
384. Id.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 326-27 (citations omitted).
387. Id. at 327.
388. Id. (citing Biss v. Tenneco, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (App. Div. 1978)).
389. 996 S.W.2d 416 (Tex. App. 1999).
390. Id. at 421-22.
391. Id. at421.
392. Id.
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home users used the saw to make many different kinds of cuts, it was
difficult to design a lower blade guard that would protect a user in every
circumstance.393 In contrast, the manufacturer provided lower blade
guards as standard equipment for its larger twelve-inch saw because the
industrial and commercial users who normally purchased this saw used it
almost exclusively for cross-cutting work.394 Notwithstanding the
defendants' claim that it was not feasible to provide lower blade guards
for ten-inch saws, the appeals court concluded that the jury could
reasonably have found that the defendants' failure to do so constituted
negligent design.39
More recently, the plaintiff brought a similar claim in Berczyk v.
Emerson Tool Co. 39 6 As in Kunze, the product in question was a ten-inch
radial saw manufactured by Emerson and sold by Sears under its
Craftsman label.397 The plaintiff contended that the defendants
"deliberately disregarded his safety, and the safety of other purchasers of
the saw, by failing to equip the saw with a lower blade guard."'3 98 The
plaintiff further alleged that even after the Occupational Safety and
Health Administration mandated that radial arm saws be equipped with
lower blade guards if they were designed for industrial use, the
defendants refused to provide lower blade guards as standard equipment
on smaller ten-inch saws because they were not ordinarily used in the
workplace.3 99 Furthermore, although Emerson offered a lower blade
guard as an option, the owner's manual advised purchasers to only use
the guard to make ninety-degree cross cuts and not to use it for rip
cuts.
4°0
After bringing suit against the defendants, the plaintiff sought to
amend his complaint to also seek punitive damages, alleging the
defendants had acted deliberately. 40 1 However, after reviewing the
evidence, the court concluded the plaintiff would not be able to prove by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendants acted with a deliberate
disregard of the rights and safety of others, as required under Minnesota
393. Id. at 422.
394. Id.
395. Id. at 423.
396. 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1007 (D. Minn. 2003).
397. Id.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Id. According to the court, in making a "rip cut," the user saws the wood along the grain,
while making a "cross cut" involves cutting against the grain. Id. at 1007 n.2 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
401. Id. at 1007.
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law, and denied the plaintiffs motion to amend.4 °2 It should be noted
that the court's refusal to allow the plaintiff to add a claim for punitive
damages had no effect on his underlying design defect claim.
40 3
D. The Scarangella Analysis
Finally, Campbell v. International Truck & Engine Corp.404 applied
the Scarangella multifactor analysis to a retail consumer. 40 5 The
decedent in that case was killed when his tractor turned over and crushed
him. 40 6 The decedent's personal representative sued the manufacturer,
International Truck and Engine Corporation (formerly Navistar),
alleging that the tractor was defectively designed because it was sold
without a ROPS.4 °7 Although the manufacturer provided a ROPS as
standard equipment on the tractor, it was possible to purchase a tractor
without it.408 The decedent purchased a tractor that was not equipped
with this protective device.40 9 The trial court granted Navistar's motion
for summary judgment.410
411On appeal, the court relied on the Scarangella Court's analysis.
Finding that the defendant failed to prove that the decedent was
"actually aware" that the ROPS was available for purchase as optional
equipment from the manufacturer, the court concluded that it also failed
to establish that the decedent, not the manufacturer, was in a superior
position to decide whether to dispense with the ROPS.4 12 Furthermore,
the court found that the defendant failed to show that the decedent
elected not to purchase the ROPS in light of the "specifically
contemplated circumstances of [his] use of the product., 4 13 Accordingly,
414the appeals court reversed the trial court's ruling on this issue.
402. Id. at 1018.
403. See id. at 1007. There is no record of how the plaintiffs design defect claim was
ultimately resolved.
404. 822 N.Y.S.2d 188 (App. Div. 2006).
405. Id. at 189-90 (citations omitted).
406. Id. at 189.
407. Id.
408. Id.
409. Id.
410. Id.
411. Id.
412. Id. at 189-90 (quoting Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 683
(N.Y. 1999)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
413. Id. at 190 (quoting Scarangella, 717 N.E.2d at 683) (internal quotation marks omitted).
414. Id.
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VI. A CRITIQUE OF CURRENT APPROACHES
Courts have employed various approaches to determine the liability
of product sellers who offer safety equipment on an optional, rather than
on a standard, basis. One approach is to determine whether the product is
defective when sold without optional safety equipment.415 Another
approach is to allow the manufacturer to offer optional safety equipment
without liability when the consumer has superior knowledge about the
risks associated with the product's proposed use.4 16 A third approach
subjects a seller to liability for the sale of a single-purpose product if it
fails to offer a cost-effective safety feature as standard equipment;
however, when a product has more than one use, a seller may offer
safety equipment on an optional basis when it is appropriate for some,
but not all, applications.417 Finally, an approach developed by the New
York Court of Appeals in Scarangella provides that a seller may offer an
optional safety feature without risking tort liability if: (1) the buyer is
thoroughly knowledgeable regarding the product and its use, and is
actually aware that the safety feature is available; (2) there exist normal
circumstances of use in which the product is not unreasonably dangerous
without the optional equipment; and (3) the buyer is in a position to
evaluate risks and benefits of not having the safety device in the
specifically contemplated circumstances of the buyer's use of the
product.41 8 The discussion below will evaluate how these approaches
relate to personal autonomy, consumer protection, and accident cost
avoidance.
A. Defective as Sold
This approach largely ignores the availability of safer optional
equipment and instead imposes liability on the seller if the product is
defective or not reasonably safe in the condition in which it is sold. In
some of the earlier cases, the courts applied the consumer expectation
test which characterized a product as defective if it was more dangerous
than the ordinary consumer would expect it to be. 419 Nowadays, most
courts apply the risk-utility test, currently favored by the Products
415. See supra Parts IV.A, V.A.
416. See supra Parts IV.B, V.B.
417. See supra Parts IV.C, V.C.
418. See supra Parts IV.D, V.D. See also Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d
679, 683 (N.Y. 1999).
419. See, e.g., Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Ford, 406 So. 2d 854, 857 (Ala. 1981); Miller v.
Dvornik, 501 N.E.2d 160, 163 (I1. App. Ct. 1986); Gross ex rel. Gross v. Running, 403 N.W.2d
243, 246 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
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Liability Restatement, to determine whether a product's design is
defective.420 The Product Liability Restatement's risk-utility analysis
requires the plaintiff to suggest a RAD.42' While this requirement is
intended to protect sellers from liability, it may cause problems for them
when sellers offer safety devices as optional equipment. In theory, a
plaintiff could point to the optional safety device (that he or she declined
to purchase) as a RAD and argue that the seller should have incorporated
this safety device as standard equipment. If the optional safety device
would have prevented the plaintiffs injury, the plaintiff would contend
that the product was defective because a RAD was available to the
manufacturer. For this reason, the defective as sold approach is not very
appropriate in cases where a manufacturer offers safety equipment on an
optional basis.
B. Superior Knowledge
A number of cases have followed the New York court's approach
in Biss, which concluded that the responsibility to select appropriate
optional safety equipment rested on purchasers when they are in a better
position to evaluate product-related risks than sellers.422 This approach
has much to recommend. Not only is it a bright-line rule, and therefore,
easy for courts to apply, but it also vindicates the autonomy principle by
enabling consumers to decide for themselves what risks they wish to
take.423
One criticism of the superior knowledge approach, however, is that
it seems to assume that the purchaser always has superior knowledge. In
fact, while the purchaser may know more than the seller about the
environment in which the product will be used, the purchaser would not
necessarily know more about the specific risks that he or she will
encounter, nor would the purchaser necessarily know more than the
seller about the risks and benefits of the product's various safety options.
This is particularly true when the transaction involves ordinary
consumer products rather than specialized products intended for
commercial or industrial use.
420. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998); supra Parts IV.A,
V.A.
421. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b).
422. Biss v. Tenneco, Inc., 409 N.Y.S.2d 874, 876-77 (App. Div. 1978). See, e.g., Scallan v.
Duriron Co., 11 F.3d 1249, 1254 (5th Cir. 1994); Davis v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 719 P.2d 324,
327 (Colo. App. 1985); Rainbow v. Albert Elia Bldg. Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 480,483 (App. Div. 1981),
aff'd, 434 N.E.2d 1345 (N.Y. 1982); Banzhaf v. ADT Sec. Sys. Sw., Inc., 28 S.W.3d 180, 187 (Tex.
App. 2000).
423. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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There are other problems with the superior knowledge approach, at
least when it is used on a "stand alone" basis. First, while it encourages
sellers to share their knowledge with purchasers, it does not necessarily
ensure that purchasers will be able to process this information properly.
Second, this test does not address the externality problem that exists
when the purchaser is not exposed to the risk created when he or she
declines to purchase optional safety equipment. That is, even though
purchasers have full knowledge of risks and benefits, they may
rationally (though immorally) decide to subject their employees to an
unreasonable risk of harm in order to save money when they purchase
industrial or commercial products.
C. Single-Purpose Versus Multi-Purpose Products
Another popular approach is to distinguish between single-purpose
424and multi-purpose products. The rationale for this approach is that the
manufacturer of a single-purpose product will know how the product
will be used and what risks will arise from the proposed use.425 For this
reason, it is appropriate to impose a duty on the manufacturer to design a
reasonably safe product and not force purchasers to make cost-benefit
426comparisons among safety devices. In contrast, when a product has
more than one function, purchasers will know how they expect to use the
product and, therefore, are in a better position than the manufacturer to
427decide whether a particular safety device is worthwhile or not.
The rationale for the single-purpose versus multi-purpose approach
seems similar to the Biss Court's superior knowledge approach, namely
that manufacturers are free to provide safety equipment on an optional
basis when purchasers are likely to have superior knowledge about the
risks associated with specific uses of a product. 42 8 However, the single-
purpose versus multi-purpose approach is narrower and more fact-
specific than the superior knowledge approach because it assumes that
purchasers have superior knowledge only in certain circumstances,
namely when the product is multifunctional.429 Unlike the superior
knowledge approach, the single-purpose versus multi-purpose approach
does not shield manufacturers from liability when a consumer's superior
424. See, e.g., Bilotta v. Kelley Co., 346 N.W.2d 616, 624 (Minn. 1984); Turney v. Ford Motor
Co., 418 N.E.2d 1079, 1083 (111. App. Ct. 1981); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Kunze, 996 S.W.2d 416,
422 (Tex. App. 1999).
425. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
426. See discussion supra Parts IV.B, IV.C, V.B, V.C.
427. See discussion supra Parts IV.B, IV.C, V.B, V.C.
428. See supra notes 204-07, 234-36 and accompanying text.
429. See discussion supra Parts PV.C, V.C.
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knowledge is based on something other than the multifunctional nature
of the product.43° Nor does this approach permit manufacturers to offer
optional safety equipment on single-purpose products even when
consumers have superior knowledge about product-related risks.4 31
D. The Scarangella Approach
New York courts and those of a few other states follow the
Scarangella approach.432 This approach attempts to provide a fair
balance between freedom of choice for consumers and the public need to
prevent overreaching by product sellers.433 The first requirement, that the
buyer be knowledgeable about the product, its intended use, and any
safety devices that may be available, implicitly recognizes that
consumers can agree to bear additional risk by declining to purchase
optional safety equipment. At the same time, this aspect of Scarangella
helps to ensure that consumers will make informed, and hopefully
intelligent, decisions about whether to purchase optional safety devices.
The second requirement, that the product be reasonably safe without the
optional equipment for some of its intended uses, is more problematic
because it seems to limit the consumer's right to decide about optional
safety equipment to multifunctional products. The third requirement, that
the buyer have the ability to evaluate risks and benefits of not having the
safety device for his or her intended use, also seems to be aimed at
ensuring that the purchaser makes an informed and rational decision. For
this reason, this requirement seems redundant and unnecessary.
VII. A PROPOSED APPROACH
As discussed earlier, there are a number of considerations that are
relevant to whether a product seller should be allowed to offer safety
devices on an optional basis instead of installing them as standard
equipment. First of all, it is desirable to uphold personal autonomy by
enabling purchasers to make their own choices about product risk
whenever possible.434 Sometimes this autonomy interest has to be
subordinated in order to protect consumers from oppression by product
sellers, however, this does not seem to be a significant problem as far as
430. See discussion supra Parts IV.C, V.C.
431. See discussion supra notes 246-66 and accompanying text.
432. See Scarangella v. Thomas Built Buses, Inc., 717 N.E.2d 679, 683 (N.Y. 1999);
discussion supra Parts IV.D, V.D.
433. See Scarangella, 717 N.E.2d at 683.
434. See discussion supra Part II.A.
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optional safety equipment is concerned.435 Finally, it is desirable to
minimize accident costs by ensuring that product-related risks are borne
by those who are in the best position to avoid them. 36
The following approach, based in part on the holding in
Scarangella, seems to provide a reasonable balance among these various
objectives: a product is not defective in design when (1) the buyer is
familiar with the product's general characteristics, including its inherent
risks; (2) the buyer is actually aware that the particular safety feature is
available; and (3) the buyer is in a position to balance the risks and
benefits of purchasing or declining to purchase the particular safety
feature.4 37
The proposed formulation acknowledges the personal autonomy
interest by requiring that the buyer be knowledgeable about the
product's general characteristics as well as kinds of optional safety
equipment that may be available. The purpose of these requirements is to
ensure that a purchaser has all of the information necessary to make an
informed decision about how much risk to accept. This means that the
product seller has an affirmative duty to provide the buyer with
information about the characteristics and availability of optional safety
equipment . 3  In most cases, purchasers of products intended for
commercial or industrial use will probably not need this protection
because they will already be aware of characteristics of the product, the
availability of safety devices, and the risks associated with the product's
intended use.43 9 The knowledge arises from the fact that purchasers
already possess considerable expertise about the products used by their
businesses. In addition, because these products are usually "big ticket"
items, purchasers have an incentive to talk to sales personnel, read
catalogs, and otherwise acquaint themselves with a product's
performance characteristics, including whether product-related risks can
be reduced by the purchase of particular safety devices. In contrast,
consumers of ordinary household products seldom have this sort of
expertise and so will benefit from the requirement that sellers disclose
information about product risks and optional safety equipment. 440
435. See, e.g., Trull v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 320 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding a car
manufacturer negligent for failing to offer a rear shoulder harness as optional, and not standard,
equipment).
436. See discussion supra Parts IV.B, V.B.
437. See Scarangella, 717 N.E.2d at 683.
438. See Campbell v. Int'l Truck & Engine Corp., 822 N.Y.S.2d 188, 190 (App. Div. 2006)
(citation omitted).
439. See supra note 205 and accompanying text.
440. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 261 A.2d 69, 83 (N.J. 1960).
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The requirement that buyers be capable of evaluating risks and
benefits is probably not necessary to protect purchasers of commercial or
industrial products. Typically, they are repeat purchasers and the
products that they buy are often very expensive. Consequently,
purchasers of commercial and industrial products are likely to engage in
some sort of cost-benefit analysis in connection with such purchases. In
many cases, they may consult with engineers and safety experts to
ensure that their cost-benefit analysis is accurate. In contrast, ordinary
consumers are more prone to cognitive limitations. On the other hand,
product sellers who offer safety equipment on an optional basis have an
economic incentive to encourage consumers to purchase safer versions
of their products because they are more expensive, and presumably more
profitable, than stripped down versions. Thus, the interests of consumers
and sellers on this issue seem to be congruent.
Finally, it must be conceded that the proposed approach does not
directly address the issue of accident cost avoidance, particularly
accident costs that occur when consumers underestimate product risks
and decline to purchase optional safety equipment that can prevent these
accidents from occurring. On the other hand, if consumers believe that a
particular safety feature will not reduce risks for them, or will seriously
impair product performance for their intended use, then a rule that
allows them to make that choice seems to be more efficiency-oriented
than one that forces a manufacturer to incorporate an unnecessary safety
device into its basic product design or risk tort liability for failing to do
so. Viewed from this perspective, allowing product sellers to offer safety
equipment on an optional basis seems to promote allocative efficiency
better than a rule that discourages this practice.
Another aspect of accident cost avoidance that the proposed
approach does not address is the existence of negative externalities in
connection with the purchase of products for commercial or industrial
use. Not only are the purchasers of commercial and industrial products
not subject to the risk of personal injury, but the risk of economic loss to
them is limited by workers compensation laws to the relatively modest
amounts provided for in statutory schedules. 44' However, tort law may
not be the best mechanism for dealing with this sort of externality
problem. In particular, a rule that discourages product sellers from
offering safety equipment on an optional basis will reduce the choices
available to purchasers and impose a needless expense on them by
441. All workers compensation statutes contain "'exclusive remedy' provisions that substitute
statutory claims for common law tort claims against employers for most work-related injuries. See
OWEN, supra note 25, at 1042 (footnote omitted); Jerry J. Phillips, Comments on the Reporters'
Study of Enterprise Responsibility for Personal Injury, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 241, 255 (1993).
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forcing them to purchase safety features that are not necessary for the
product's intended use. A better, though not ideal, approach would be to
rely on government regulation to achieve a satisfactory degree of
workplace safety. The federal government regulates workplace safety
under the provisions of the Occupational Safety and Health Act
("OSHA"). 442  Although OSHA establishes design standards for
industrial machinery and other workplace products, it regulates
employers rather than product manufacturers." 3  Nevertheless,
manufacturers of commercial or industrial products have an incentive to
design products that will comply with OSHA standards. Therefore, when
OSHA regulations require an employer to equip its machines with a
particular safety device, employers will obviously purchase such devices
whether the manufacturer provides them as standard or optional
equipment. OSHA regulations may not eliminate all negative
externalities, but they can provide a floor for product safety that
employers, and therefore product sellers, must meet.
Assuming that the approach proposed in this Article is superior to
the existing ones, how should it be given effect? The best way to
implement this proposal would be for courts to adopt it over time, with
modifications if necessary. This process for the development of common
law doctrines has worked well in the past. However, judicial acceptance
of this proposal could possibly be accelerated if it were incorporated into
the Products Liability Restatement. At the present time, a comment to
Section 2 of the Products Liability Restatement contains a hypothetical
involving bullet-proof vests. 4  The plaintiffs employer purchases a
model that provides only front and back protection because it is cheaper,
more comfortable, and allows greater flexibility of movement. 445 The
personal representative of a highway patrol officer, who is shot and
killed, alleges that the vest was defective because it did not provide
wraparound protection.446 'The drafters of the Products Liability
Restatement conclude that the vest's design is not defective just because
it has disadvantages as well as advantages." 7 This conclusion could be
clarified by inserting an additional paragraph that sets forth a rule similar
to the proposal in this Article.
442. Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2001).
443. See id. § 654; Minichello v. U.S. Indus., Inc., 756 F.2d 26, 29 (6th Cir. 1985); Hughes v.
Lumbernens Mut. Cas. Co., 2 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999).
444. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. f, illus. 10 (1998).
445. Id.
446. Id.
447. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
There are a variety of rules that govern the imposition of tort
liability when a product seller allows the purchaser to choose what sort
of safety equipment to install on a product he or she wishes to purchase.
Two of them, the contract specification doctrine and the rule relating to
the sale of industrial machinery without any safety equipment, deal with
special situations and are arguably sui generis. This Article has focused
instead on product sales where a seller offers safety equipment on an
optional basis rather than installing it as standard equipment. The courts
have employed various approaches to determine liability in such
cases. 448 This Article has concluded that none of these approaches is
fully responsive to the needs of buyers and sellers and has proposed an
alternative. Under this proposed approach, a product will not be
considered defective in design if the buyer is familiar with the product's
general characteristics and inherent risks, is actually aware the safety
feature in question is available, and is in a position to balance the risks
and benefits of purchasing or declining to purchase the safety feature.
448. See supra Parts IV, V.
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